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On June 14, 1985 two gunmen commandeered Trans World Airlines
Flight 847 between Athens and Rome and forced it to fly to Beirut, Leba-
non.1 There, they killed off-duty U.S. Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem
2
and held thirty-nine U.S. citizens hostage for seventeen days. 3 Later that
year, a federal grand jury in Washington, D.C. indicted four men on
hijacking and murder charges arising out of the Flight 847 events.4 In
early 1987 West German authorities arrested one of the indicted, Mo-
hammed Ali Hamadei, as he attempted to bring three bottles of liquid
explosives into West Germany.5
The United States immediately expressed an intention to have
Hamadei extradited for trial under the 1985 indictment and began nego-
tiations with West Germany.6 In response to West German insistence,
7
the United States agreed, as part of a proposed extradition agreement,
not to execute Hamadei should he be convicted." When two of its na-
tionals were kidnapped in Beirut, however, West Germany hesitated to
accede to the American request.9 The case remains unsettled, although
West German officials are considering prosecuting Hamadei in Germany
for the hijacking.10
t Major, United States Marine Corps; Member, Tennessee Bar. The views expressed in
this article do not necessarily reflect those of any agency of the U.S. government.
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3. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1987, at Al, col. 3.
4. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1987, at A6, col. 1.
5. N.Y. Times, supra note 3.
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The Hamadei case illustrates the uncertainties surrounding U.S. juris-
diction over international terrorists whose crimes affect U.S. interests." I
Similar jursidictional conflicts will undoubtedly surface in the future,
given the increasing number of international terrorist offenses. After all,
recent statistics point to an alarming rise in international terrorist activ-
ity. In 1985, the last year for which complete statistics are currently
available, the U.S. Department of State counted 782 separate incidents of
international terrorism. This represents an increase of thirty percent
over the number of such instances in 1984, and is fifty percent higher
than the average number of incidents over the previous five years. In the
1985 incidents, in which citizens of at least eighty-four countries were
victimized, more than eight hundred persons were killed and some
twelve hundred wounded. 12
This article will review the various means by which a U.S. court can
gain jurisdiction over international terrorists, and will examine proposed
changes designed to make U.S. prosecution easier. It is the author's be-
lief that international terrorism against U.S. interests can best be curbed
by creating a thorough, thoughtful criminal code, and by providing U.S.
law enforcement personnel and prosecutors the tools to bring offenders
against that code to justice. By concentrating on jurisdiction, this article
avoids the problems inherent in defining terrorism; 13 it takes as a given
11. The United States has attempted to gain jursidiction over international terrorists in a
number of other recent incidents as well. U.S. arrest warrants have been issued for Moham-
med Abbas and other Achille Lauro hijackers. See United States v. Abbas, No. 85-0321
(D.D.C. filed Oct. 11, 1985) (arrest warrant and criminal complaint), reprinted in 24 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS [I.L.M.] 1554 (1985). In November 1985, the State Department offered a
reward for information resulting in the arrest and punishment in the United States of those
responsible for the homicide of Leon Klinghoffer aboard the Achille Lauro. See Wall St. J.,
Nov. 26, 1985, at 62, col. 4.
12. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1985, at 1 (1986) [herein-
after DEP'T OF STATE, TERRORISM: 1985]. The 1984 statistics were themselves 20% greater
than the average of the preceding four years. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM: 1984, at 2 (1985) [hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE, TERRORISM: 1984].
For purposes of these statistics, the State Department defines "terrorism" as "premeditated,
politically motivated violence, perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience." International
terrorism involves "citizens or territory of more than one country." DEP'T OF STATE, TER-
RORISM: 1985, supra, at inside front cover. "In practice it is of course extremely difficult to
find examples of purely domestic terrorism. In almost every case some cross-border movement
of terrorists, or terrorist weapons.., is involved." Wilkinson, Fighting the Hydra: Terrorism
and the Rule of Law, 7 HARV. INT'L REV. 11, 12 (1985). Therefore, the adjective "interna-
tional" will be used in this paper only to refer to terrorist acts that take place outside the
territory of the state of which the perpetrator is a national, or are directed knowingly against
the citizens or interests of a state of which the perpetrator is not a national.
13. "'Terrorism' is a term of uncertain legal content .... At the international level, in
particular, there is no agreed-upon definition of 'terrorism' and hence no international crime of
terrorism." J. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 3-4 (1985). At one time,
at least, the United States considered it "counter productive, even if it were technically feasi-
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that international terrorism is criminal activity that happens to span in-
ternational boundaries. As such, this discussion will not consider long-
term solutions to the complex social and political problems "underlying"
terrorist actions.
Part One of this article will concentrate on the possibility of U.S.
courts acquiring subject matter jurisdiction over international terrorist
acts. Recent legislative changes expanding U.S. extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction over terrorist acts have been largely the result of numerous
multilateral anti-terrorist conventions concluded during the past fifteen
years. Part Two will examine methods by which U.S. courts can obtain
personal jurisdiction over terrorist offenders. Examining subject matter
and personal jurisdiction over international terrorists is, admittedly, a
piecemeal approach to a complex problem. Prosecuting international
terrorists under U.S. criminal laws will not "solve" the long-term terror-
ist threat. Nevertheless, terrorists must be subject to judicial process.
Criminal prosecution is America's best hope for labelling terrorists hostis
generi humani in the international community and thus for forcing an
eventual curtailment of terrorist activity. The value of global moral out-
rage in inducing a remission of terrorist activity cannot be overstated.14
I. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter of Terrorist Offenses Abroad
Since the 1960's, one aspect of the U.S. response to transnational ter-
rorism has been participation in international agreements designed to
bring to justice the perpetrators of such political violence. 15 These agree-
ble, to attempt to reach an internationally agreed definition of terrorism." Bennett, US. Initia-
tives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism, 7 INT'L LAw. 753 (1973). One
commentator concludes that a definition of terrorism must "protect the innocent bystander
from brute, indiscriminate violence visited on him from afar." Id. at 760. Today, the U.S.
government and U.S. law abound with divergent definitions of terrorism. Probably the pre-
dominant definition is that found in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976 (FISA),
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (1982). It defines terrorism first as violent or dangerous activities that
violate federal or state law in the United States, or would if commited within the jurisdiction of
the United States or any state. Id. at § 1801(c)(1). Second, such acts must also be intended (1)
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (2) to influence the conduct of a government by
intimidation or coercion, or (3) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or
kidnapping. Id. at § 1801(c)(2). For other U.S. government definitions, see TERRORISM RE-
SEARCH AND ANALYTICAL CENTER, TERRORISM SECTION, CRIMINAL INVESrIGATIvE Divi-
SION, FBI ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE U.S., 1983, Preface, quoted in R.
CLINE & Y. ALEXANDER, STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM: REPORT PREPARED FOR THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY 110 (1985); DEP'T OF STATE, TERRORISM: 1984, supra note 12; CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ii (1980), quoted in R.
CLINE & Y. ALEXANDER, supra, at 109; DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, PROTECTION OF DOD
PERSONNEL AGAINST TERRORIST ACTS, DOD DIRECTIVE 2000.12-H (1983).
14. See R. FRIEDLANDER, TERROR-VIOLENCE 130-31 (1983).
15. See generally Oakley, International Terrorism: Current Trends and the U.S. Response,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE CURRENT POLICY No. 706, at 6-7 (1985); BUREAU OF PUBLIC AF-
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ments typically take the form of mutual pledges either to extradite the
offender or to submit his case to domestic prosecution, a formulation
referred to as aut dedere autjudicare.16 As a practical matter, many
offenders whose cases fall within the terms of such agreements are found
in a state to which they have fled after committing their offenses. If the
apprehending state is to have any real alternative to extradition under the
rule of aut dedere autjudicare, its domestic law must embody some the-
ory of jurisdiction 17 that reaches offenses perpetrated beyond its borders.
Moreover, states other than the victimized or "refuge" nation may have
legitimate interests in punishing the terrorists.18
A. Theories of National Jurisdiction over Criminal Offenses
International law recognizes five broad principles as providing the ba-
sis for subject matter jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad: (1) ter-
ritoriality; (2) nationality of the accused; (3) nationality of the victim; (4)
protection of state interests; and (5) universality of certain offenses.19
The principle of territoriality, the power of a state to regulate conduct
within its borders and to enforce such prescriptions, is universally recog-
nized20 and is inseparable from the sovereignty of the state.21 A state's
territory includes its land area, internal waters, and territorial sea,22 as
FAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (1985) ("No matter what our
commitment and capability may be, we cannot succeed alone when the threat originates and is
carried out abroad where other governments have the major responsibility.").
16. See DeSchutter, Problems of Jurisdiction in the International Control and Repression of
Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 385-86 (M. Bassiouni ed.
1973); see also Costello, International Terrorism and the Development of the Principle Aut
Dedere Aut Judicare, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 483 (1975). The Committee on International
Terrorism of the International Law Association uses the phrase aut judicare aut dedere. J.
MURPHY, supra note 13, at 59.
17. Jurisdiction has been defined as "the capacity of a state under international law to
prescribe or to enforce a rule of law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (2D)] § 6 (1962). More re-
cently, the concept has been divided into three categories: jurisdiction to prescribe, to
adjudicate, and to enforce. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES (Proposed Final Draft 1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (REVISED)]
§ 401. Although this article is principally concerned with the exercise of jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate, it will nonetheless also consider the effects of U.S. attempts to prescribe and to enforce its
law extraterritorially. This article will use the phrase "subject matter jurisdiction" to mean the
competence of a court to deal with the criminal allegation brought before it, as opposed to its
capacity to compel the attendance of the defendant.
18. For an overview of the enactments of many English-speaking nations and of the con-
stituent states of the United States in this regard, see generally LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM (Y. Alexander & A. Nanes eds. 1986).
19. M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 205
(1974). The Restatement lists only four such principles, omitting that of nationality of the
victim. See RESTATEMENT (2D), supra note 17, § 10.
20. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 204.
21. Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
22. RESTATEMENT (2D), supra note 17, §§ 11-17.
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well as the vessels, aircraft, and spacecraft of the state,23 and of its mili-
tary forces deployed abroad. 24 Each state has jurisdiction to adjudicate
crimes committed wholly or partly within such territory.25 This princi-
ple also extends to the acts of aliens beyond state borders under two con-
ditions: if such conduct has an effect within the state's territory and
constitutes a crime or tort "under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems," or if the effect within the territory is substan-
tial and foreseeable and its regulation is not inconsistent with generally
recognized principles of justice.
26
The principle of nationality of the accused, also referred to as the ac-
tive personality theory, is equally well-settled 27 and universally ac-
cepted.28 U.S. courts have upheld this principle on numerous
occasions;29 U.S. legislation, however, has adopted this principle only
sparingly, and solely in the national security context.a0
The passive personality principle, based upon the nationality of the
victim, is the subject of considerable controversy. 31 The 1935 Harvard
23. M. BASsIOUNI, supra note 19, at 224. Such jurisdiction is not exclusive, however,
when applied in the territorial seas and airspace of another state. Id. at 225-27.
24. Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116; Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 512
(1878); RESTATEMENT (2D), supra note 17, §§ 31-32; see King, Jurisdiction over Friendly For-
eign Forces, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 539 (1942); Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity from
Supervisory Jurisdiction, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 380 (1949); Barton, Foreign Armed Forces:
Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 186 (1950).
25. CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Harvard Research in International Law
Project), 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 15, 21 (Supp. 1935) (Extradition) [hereinafter Harvard Research];
see also id. at 435, 439 (Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime).
26. RESTATEMENT (2D), supra note 17, § 18. Bassiouni refers to this as the "subjective-
objective territorial theory." M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 218. In a regulatory context,
U.S. antitrust and other commercial legislation has been extensively interpreted to extend to
international business operations that have effects within this country, arousing substantial
international controversy. See, e.g., Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality,
19 INT'L LAW. 887 (1985); Sennett & Gavil, Antitrust Jurisdiction, Extraterritorial Conduct
and Interest Balancing, 19 INT'L LAW. 1185 (1985); Pengilley, Extraterritorial Effects of
United States Commercial and Antitrust Legislation: A View from "Down Under", 16 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 833 (1983).
27. See Harvard Research, supra note 25, at 440.
28. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 251.
29. In United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922), for example, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that a citizen was punishable domestically for overseas conspiracy to defraud a U.S. gov-
ernment corporation abroad. See also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (U.S.
citizen properly convicted of contempt upon return to the United States on the basis of earlier
disregard, while in France, of properly served subpeona requiring him to return to testify as
witness in criminal case); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dis-
missed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981) (U.S. court had jurisdiction
to try citizen for murder of congressman in Guyana on variety of theories, including defend-
ant's nationality).
30. Examples of such legislation include the Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453
(1982), and the Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1982).
31. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 17, § 402 (Reporters' Notes at 192); M. BAS-
SIOUNI, supra note 19, at 255-56.
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Research in International Law Project omitted it as a basis for criminal
jurisdiction,32 and it was expressly disavowed in the Second Restate-
ment. 33 However, as the reporters for the 1986 Draft Restatement have
noted, it has been increasingly invoked and accepted when applied to
terrorist or other organized attacks upon a state's nationals as well as to
assassinations of a state's ambassadors or other officials. 34
The protective principle is, in effect, a broad theory allowing the state
to reach the subject matter of criminal activity abroad that affects its
interests. 35 Not all interests, however, have been held to justify invoca-
tion of this principle. The conduct the state seeks to regulate, and the
misconduct it consequently seeks to punish, must "threaten its security
as a state or the operation of its governmental functions" and be gener-
ally recognized as a crime.
36
Of all the classical theories of criminal jurisdiction, the principle of
universal jurisdiction has the most interesting recent history. The 1935
Harvard Research Project mandated universal jurisdiction over the
crime of piracy37 as well as over other offenses when committed in cer-
tain narrowly defined circumstances. A state, for example, was said to
have jurisdiction over a crime other than piracy if the offense was com-
mitted in a stateless territory and injured the complaining state or one of
its nationals.38 The 1962 Restatement, however, limited universal juris-
diction to piracy alone. 39 Despite these early limitations, the number of
crimes subject to universal jurisdiction has increased substantially in re-
cent years. The 1986 Draft Restatement, remarking on an "[e]xpanding
class of universal offenses,"'4 posited state competence to define and pun-
ish offenses "recognized by the community of nations as of universal con-
cern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft,
genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism," without regard to the
existence of other links between the state and the crime.41
B. Multilateral Counterterrorist Conventions
The United Nations and its agencies have sponsored a number of mul-
tilateral conventions in response to international terrorism. The Organi-
32. Harvard Research, supra note 25, at 440.
33. RESTATEMENT (2D), supra note 17, § 30(2).
34. RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 17, § 402 (Reporters' Notes at 192).
35. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 259.
36. RESTATEMENT (2D), supra note 17, § 33.
37. Harvard Research, supra note 25, art. 9.
38. Id. art. 10.
39. RESTATEMENT (2D), supra note 17, § 34.
40. RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 17, § 404 (Comment a).
41. Id. §404.
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zation of American States has also produced one, specifically targeted at
violence against diplomats. Rather than attempting to deal comprehen-
sively with the problem of transnational political violence, these conven-
tions adopt a piecemeal approach. Each concerns a particular class of
offenses that has inspired multinational resolve either because the acts
comprising it are committed frequently or because the acts have poten-
tially grievous consequences.
1. The Tokyo Convention
The Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft,42 commonly referred to as the 1963 Tokyo Convention,
was an early attempt to deal with the offense of aircraft hijacking. The
Convention covers penal offenses and other acts, "whether or not they
are offenses," that may jeopardize the safety of aircraft in flight or of
persons or property thereon. 43 Such acts, to be cognizable, must occur
aboard an aircraft registered in a signatory state while that aircraft is in
ffight,44 on the surface of the high seas, or in any other stateless
territory.45
The thrust of the Tokyo Convention is to require its member states to
extend their national jurisdiction over the crimes within its purview.46
Thus, each member state is obligated 47 to establish jurisdiction over ex-
traterritorial acts aboard aircraft registered under its laws.48 The Con-
vention is an attempt to ensure that at least one state has criminal
jurisdiction over the subject matter of every unlawful interference with
an aircraft in flight.49
Two aspects of the Tokyo Convention are interesting in light of later
developments. First, the Convention defines neither the phrase "offenses
42. Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter To-
kyo Convention].
43. Id. art. 1.1(b).
44. Id. art. 1.2. "In flight," for international law purposes, is defined as that period be-
tween the closing of the external doors following embarkation and their opening for disembar-
kation, except that following a "forced landing" the Convention continues to apply until
competent authorities have taken over responsibility for the aircraft and for the persons and
property aboard. Id. art. 5.2.
45. Id. art. 1.2.
46. Id. art. 3.3.
47. Id. art. 3.2.
48. Id. art. 3.1.
49. But see R. LILLICH, TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: CONVENTIONS AND COMMEN-
TARY 1 (1982) ("Even though a Contracting State is required to adopt the laws necessary to
give its courts jurisdiction, it is not obligated to ensure that all offenders will be prosecuted
.... The Convention provides for a Contracting State to take delivery from the aircraft com-
mander of a suspected offender .... but it places no obligation on the receiving State to grant




against penal law" nor the other acts "whether or not they are offenses"
with which it is concerned. The latter omission is not critical; it appears
to place the definition and handling of non-criminal acts that threaten
the aircraft's safety within the discretion of the aircraft commander for
such immediate action as he may deem necessary.50 But the former
omission is more serious in that it leaves the definition of an international
criminal offense open to the inconsistencies of national law. Equally
problematic, signatory states need take no further action against hijack-
ers other than to return the aircraft and cargo to its rightful owner and
allow the passengers and crew to continue their journey.5 1 That is, there
is no Tokyo Convention obligation to extradite offenders52 or to subject
them to any type of prosecution.
2. The Hague Convention
The Tokyo Convention did little to deter aircraft hijackings, which
increased dramatically during the late 1960's and early 1970's.5 3 Out of
this mounting crisis was born the Hague Convention of 1970.54 Article 1
of the Hague Convention corrects a major deficiency of the Tokyo Con-
vention by establishing and defining the international crime of hijacking
a civil aircraft.5 5 It defines hijacking as the unlawful seizure or exercise
of control, or an attempt to seize or exercise control, over an aircraft in
50. Tokyo Convention, supra note 42, arts. 5-10.
51. Id. art. 11.2.
52. Id. art. 16.2.
53. One authority provides the following figures for that period: 1968-35; 1969-87;
1970-83; 1971-58; 1972-62; 1973-22. W. LAQUEUR, TERRORISM 108 n.49 (1977).
54. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The
treaty entered into force on October 14, 1971; 127 nations have ratified it. U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 220-21 (1986) [hereinafter TREATIES IN FORCE]; see also Cos-
tello, supra note 16, at 486-87. The Hague Convention is generally considered to have been
influential in reducing the number of hijackings in the mid-1970's. Bekes, The Legal Problems
of Hijacking and Taking of Hostages, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE CONTEMPO-
RARY WORLD 346, 349 (M. Livingston ed. 1978). Other factors influencing this development
included greater airport security, a lessening of hijacking's publicity value as the world grew
weary of the problem, and the increasing reluctance of Arab countries to provide sanctuary for
Palestinian hijackers. W. LAQUEUR, supra note 53, at 108. Although the number of hijackings
has increased somewhat in the last ten years, the yearly figure has not returned to the high
point reached between 1969 and 1972. The U.S. Department of Transportation has estab-
lished the following annual totals of hijackings attempted worldwide: 1974-26; 1975-25;
1976-18; 1977-32; 1978-31; 1979-27; 1980-41; 1981-32; 1982-34; 1983-32; 1984-
28. OFFICE OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, AIR-
CRAFT HIJACKINGS AND OTHER CRIMINAL ACTS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION: STATISTICAL
AND NARRATIVE REPORTS (1985).
55. The Hague Convention does not apply to "aircraft used in military, customs, or police
services." Hague Convention, supra note 54, art. 3.2.
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flight by force, threat of force, or intimidation. Anyone who acts as an
accomplice of a hijacker also commits the offense of hijacking.56
More importantly, article 7, the heart of the Hague Convention,
adopts the aut dedere autjudicare principle. This principle gives a state
the choice of extraditing the offender, or, should it be unwilling or unable
to do so because of internal legal constraints, of referring the case for
prosecution.5 7 However, the Hague Convention, like most such agree-
ments, stipulates as the alternative to extradition not prosecution per se,
but submission of the case to national prosecuting authorities for consid-
eration of prosecution. While this arrangement has been criticized be-
cause of its susceptibility to political influence,58 it is difficult to conceive
of an acceptable alternative to the requirement of mere submission of the
charges; in many liberal democracies in particular, such a restriction on
prosecutorial discretion would arouse objections of political interference
in national judicial processes.
Article 4 requires a contracting state to extend its extraterritorial crim-
inal jurisdiction over the offense of hijacking if it is: (1) the state where
the aircraft is registered; (2) the state where the aircraft lands with the
hijacker still aboard; (3) the state in which the aircraft lessee's principal
place of business is located or, if the lessee has no such place of business,
the place in which it maintains its permanent residence; or (4) the state in
which an alleged offender is present, but from which he is not extra-
dited.59 If it was an aim of the Tokyo Convention to ensure that at least
one state would have jurisdiction over any hijacking,60 a purpose of the
Hague Convention is to establish a form of near-universal jurisdiction
over hijacking, or at least a system of overlapping jurisdictions over each
hijacking incident. To give effect to such jurisdiction, contracting states
are obliged to take into custody or otherwise assure the presence of any
alleged offender found within their territories, 61 and immediately thereaf-
ter to notify all potentially interested states of the apprehension.62 Fi-
nally, the offense is to be made punishable "by severe penalties" under
the national law of each of the convention's signatories. 63
56. Id. art. 1. "In flight" is defined in art. 3 in a similar fashion as it is in the Tokyo
Convention. See supra note 44.
57. Costello, supra note 16, at 486-88; Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 13.
58. J. MURPHY, supra note 13, at 13:
Once the case is in the hands of government attorneys, they retain complete discre-
tion as to whether to bring the case to trial. While their decisions may be based on
such traditional grounds as insufficiency of evidence, or unavailability of witnesses,
they may also turn on considerations of political expediency clothed in legal terms.
59. Hague Convention, supra note 54, art. 4.
60. See supra text accompanying note 49.
61. Hague Convention, supra note 54, art. 6.1.
62. Id. art. 6.4.




3. The Montreal Convention
The Montreal Convention of 197164 requires its contracting states to
subject to "severe penalties" by their national legislation a much broader
range of activities interfering with civil aviation than did either the To-
kyo or Hague Convention. 65 It defines as international crimes acts endan-
gering the safety of an aircraft in flight or rendering an aircraft incapable
of flight. These include: acts of violence against persons on board an
aircraft in flight; destruction of, or damage to, an aircraft in service; sabo-
tage of an aircraft in service; destruction of, or damage to, air navigation
facilities, or interference with their operation; and communication of
false information that, by its communication, endangers an aircraft in
flight.66 Moreover, any attempt to commit these offenses, or to aid or
abet one who commits or attempts any of them, constitutes an offense.67
Contracting states must "endeavor to take all practicable measures"
for the prevention of the offenses enumerated in the Montreal Conven-
tion.68 They must make such crimes extraditable;69 should a custodial
state decline to extradite an alleged offender, it is required, "without ex-
ception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its
territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution. ' 70 Unlike the Hague Convention, the Montreal Conven-
tion also places upon those authorities an obligation to make their deci-
sion to prosecute "in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary
offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. ' 71 This formula-
tion goes as far as is practically possible to overcome the objection that it
is meaningless to impose a requirement of aut dedere autjudicare upon
criminal systems subject to political influence. 72 The requirements for
exercising subject matter jurisdiction are identical to those set out in the
Hague Convention, 73 except that an additional right exists to establish
territorial criminal jurisdiction in the state where the offense was
committed. 74
64. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971,24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 ILL.M. 1151 [hereinafter Mon-
treal Convention]. The treaty entered into force on January 26, 1973; 28 states have ratified it.
TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 54, at 222.
65. Montreal Convention, supra note 64, art. 3.
66. Id. art. 1.1. This formulation of the article is adapted from R. LILLICH, supra note 49,
at 38.
67. Montreal Convention, supra note 64, art. 1.2.
68. Id. art. 10.1.
69. Id. art. 8.
70. Id. art. 7.
71. Id.
72. See supra text accompanying note 58.
73. See supra text accompanying note 59.
74. Montreal Convention, supra note 64, art. 5.
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4. The New York Convention
Unlike the previous conventions developed specifically in response to
threats to civil aviation, the 1973 New York Convention, 75 another
United Nations convention, is intended to deter violence against "inter-
nationally protected persons." These persons are defined as heads of
state, heads of government, foreign ministers and their families when in
foreign countries, 76 and officials of states or of international organiza-
tions and their families when other international law grants them special
protection.77 Under the Convention, contracting states must protect
such persons against murder, kidnapping, or other attacks upon their
person or liberty; violent attacks upon their means of transport, private
accommodations, or official premises likely to endanger their persons or
liberty; and threats and attempts.78 The enumerated acts, however, are
not specifically made international offenses, as was the case in the Hague
and Montreal Conventions. Instead, they are to be made the subject of
national prohibitions by the various contracting states.
79
Like the agreements already discussed, the New York Convention is
founded on the principle of aut dedere autjudicare; contracting states are
required, first, to "take the appropriate measures" to ensure the contin-
ued presence of an alleged violator found within its territory, and second,
to notify without delay other states associated with the alleged offender,
the victim, or the situs of the offense.80 Thereafter, the custodial state
must extradite the offender upon request or, "if it does not extradite him,
submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution." 81 A con-
tracting state is obliged to establish jurisdiction over the specified crimes:
when they are committed in the territory of the state or aboard a ship or
aircraft registered in the state; when the alleged offender is a national of
the state; when the victim is an internationally protected person by virtue
75. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No.
8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The treaty entered into force
February 20, 1977; 68 states have ratified it. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 54, at 308.
76. Id. art. 1.
77. Id. art. 1.1(b). For an overview of privileges and immunities of state and international
organization officials in international law, see Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
Apr. 18, 1961, arts. 29-30, 3 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 50 U.N.T.S. 95; Ling, A Compar-
ative Study of the Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Member Representatives and
Officials with the Traditional Privileges and Immunities of Diplomatic Agents, 33 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 91 (1976).
78. See New York Convention, supra note 75, art. 2.1.
79. Id. art. 2.2.
80. Id. art. 6.1.




of functions he performs for the state; or when the perpetrator of an
article 2 offense is found within the state and is not extradited.82
5. The OAS Convention
Whereas the New York Convention seeks to enhance the security of
"internationally protected persons" through mandatory changes in the
domestic law of its contracting parties,83 the 1971 OAS Convention 84
establishes a class of crimes known as "common crimes of international
significance" for kidnapping, murder, or other assaults against the life or
personal integrity of, or extortion related to such crimes against, "those
persons to whom the state has the duty to give special protection accord-
ing to international law." 85 While it is accurate to say that the OAS
Convention was largely superseded in 1977 when the New York Conven-
tion entered into force,86 the more precise scope of the OAS Convention
as to offenses covered, the outright internationalization of the crimes it
does specify, and its potentially more flexible inclusion of protected per-
sons give it continued relevance.
The OAS Convention requires states "[t]o comply most expeditiously
with the requests for extradition concerning the criminal acts contem-
plated in this convention"; 87 alternatively, it provides for submission of a
case to the national prosecuting authorities of the requested state if extra-
dition is denied because the fugitive is a national of the requested state
"or because of some other legal or constitutional impediment. ' 88 The
OAS Convention makes no specific provision for enlarging the criminal
jurisdiction of contracting states. On the other hand, since this conven-
tion obligates a state to submit to domestic prosecution those cases in
which it declines to extradite a fugitive-"as if the act had been commit-
ted in its territory" 89-it must require an implicit juridical basis upon
which states can proceed in their own courts. This minimal extraterrito-
82. Id. art. 3.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
84. Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971,
27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413, O.A.S.T.S. 37, at 6 [hereinafter OAS Convention]. The
treaty entered into force on October 16, 1973; seven states have ratified it. TREATIES IN
FORCE, supra note 54, at 309.
85. OAS Convention, supra note 84, art. 2. It is not clear exactly who these protected
persons are. "Precisely how far the convention's scope of protection does extend is a matter of
conjecture." J. MURPHY, supra note 13, at 12.
In addition to creating this class of crimes, the convention requires contracting states "[t]o
endeavor to have the criminal acts contemplated in this convention included in their penal
laws, if not already so included." OAS Convention, supra note 84, art. 8(d).
86. J. MURPHY, supra note 13, at 11-12.
87. OAS Convention, supra note 84, art. 8(e).
88. Id. art. 5.
89. Id.
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rial jurisdiction should be sufficient to establish jurisdiction over kidnap-
ping, murder, or assaults against the life or personal integrity of an
internationally protected person or extortion in connection with those
crimes, regardless of where such offenses occurred, if the alleged offender
is found within the territory of a contracting state.90
6. The Hostages Convention
The international community's recognition of the need for anti-terror-
ist legislation is evidenced by the United Nations' rapid passage of the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.91 The Con-
vention was proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1976, and
approved by the General Assembly just three years later, in December
1979.92 The United States signed the Convention four days later, with
the Senate unanimously agreeing to ratification in July 1981. 93
Under the Hostages Convention, the international offense of hostage-
taking is committed by "[a]ny person who seizes or detains and threatens
to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (... the 'hos-
tage') in order to compel a third party... to do or abstain from doing
any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage
... ." Attempts to commit or to abet the offense are also crimes. 94 Pro-
visions dealing with the custody of alleged offenders, 95 the notification of
affected states and international organizations, 96 and the choice of either
extradition 97 or submission for prosecution98 are comparable to those of
the Hague, Montreal, and New York Conventions. However, a state
party to the Hostages Convention is bound to refuse extradition if it has
substantial grounds to believe that a resulting prosecution in the request-
ing state would be tainted by prejudice against the accused based on his
race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion. 99 The Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee report to the Senate concluded that this
provision will have no effect on U.S. extradition practice, which, it
90. Id. art. 2.
91. G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39), U.N. Doc. A/34/819 (1979),
[hereinafter Hostages Convention]. The treaty entered into force on January 6, 1985; 29 states
have ratified it. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 54, at 308.
92. S. REP. No. 36, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1983).
93. Id. An account of the negotiation of the Convention in the United Nations Sixth
Committee may be found in Aston, The United Nations Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages: Realistic or Rhetoric?, in BRITISH PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 139 (P. Wilkinson
ed. 1981).
94. Hostages Convention, supra note 91, art. 1.
95. Id. art. 6.1.
96. Id. art. 6.2.
97. Id. art. 10.
98. Id. art. 8.
99. Id. art. 9.1.
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pointed out, is governed entirely by bilateral treaties. 1°° This view is
questionable, in that the Convention specifically provides that, with re-
spect to hostage-taking and related offenses, "all extradition treaties and
arrangements applicable between States Parties are modified... to the
extent that they are incompatible with this Convention."101 Thus, the
provision could give reluctant states a facade of law behind which to
disguise the political motives prompting a denial of extradition.
A party to the Hostages Convention is obliged to amend its national
law so as to establish criminal jurisdiction over hostage-takings within its
territory or aboard ships and aircraft registered in its territory, by any
person subsequently found within its territory or by its own nationals, or
carried out to compel that state to do or refrain from doing any act.
Furthermore, the Convention provides for discretionary national juris-
diction over foreign hostage-takings by stateless persons who habitually
reside in the state, and over those incidents in which nationals of the state
are taken hostage.
10 2
7. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
In September 1985 there were eighty-five nuclear reactor power plants
in the United States licensed for full power and another five licensed for
low power. Construction permits had been granted for an additional
thirty-seven plants.' 0 3 There have as yet been no terrorist attacks and
only one terrorist threat against any nuclear facility in the United States:
a 1984 announcement by the "Radical Nuclear Group" that it would use
"terrorist violence" against nuclear weapons facilities.' °4 With the ex-
ception of one rocket attack upon a controversial French breeder reactor
under construction, 0 5 there have been no incidents outside the United
States either. Still, it cannot be denied that nuclear terrorism is a very
real possibility.
In 1979, responding to the possibility of nuclear terrorism, fifty-eight
states and the European Atomic Energy Commission, under the sponsor-
100. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CON-
VENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES, SENATE EXEC. REP. No. 17, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1981).
101. Hostages Convention, supra note 91, art. 9.2.
102. Id. art. 5.
103. S. REP. No. 143, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985).
104. B. HOFFMAN, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE POTENTIAL THREAT
TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES v n.1 (1986). A 1982 demonstration using flares against an Illinois
nuclear power plant apparently amounted to little more than a publicity stunt that failed to
attract the notice of even the plant's operators until its perpetrators produced videotapes of
the event. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 29, 1982, at 17, col. 6.
105. On January 18, 1982, five Soviet-made RPG-7 anti-tank rockets were fired at the
reactor. Four of the missiles hit its concrete outer shell, producing a hole in it. Equally dis-
turbing was the report that the rockets were readily available on the European illegal arms
market for about $500 each. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1982, at A3, col. 1.
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ship of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 10 6 negotiated a Con-
vention10 7 requiring each state party to criminalize numerous offenses
relating to nuclear material. These include the theft, embezzlement, or
fraudulent obtainment of nuclear material; the unlawful receipt, posses-
sion, use, transfer, alteration, disposal, or dispersal of nuclear material
that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or
substantial damage to property; any demand for nuclear material by
threat, force, or intimidation; any threat to use nuclear material to cause
death, serious injury, or substantial property damage; any extortion by
threat to steal nuclear material; and any attempt to commit or complicity
in such acts.108 Various provisions dealing with the detention of alleged
offenders,10 9 notification of states concerned, °10 extradition,' and sub-
mission for prosecution if extradition is refused" t2 are comparable to
those found in the Hague Convention.
Each state party is obliged to ensure its jurisdiction over the enumer-
ated offenses when such crimes are committed in its territory-including
aboard ships and aircraft registered in the state-or when the alleged
offender is a national of the state, regardless of the situs of the crime or
whether the alleged offender is present in the state but cannot be extra-
dited. In addition, a state may obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over an
offense involving nuclear material when it is "involved" in international
transport of the material that is the subject of the offense, either as its
exporter or importer."
3
The Senate unanimously consented to ratification of the Convention in
1981.114 The United States formally ratified it in December 1982, but too
few states have ratified it for it to come into force internationally.," 5
106. R. LILLICH, supra note 49, at 134; see also SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, S.
EXEC. REP. No. 18, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter REPORT ON NUCLEAR MATE-
RIAL CONVENTION]. The Convention was initially proposed by the United States in 1974.
Implementing the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material: Hearing on S.
1446 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1982) (opening statement of Senator Mathias) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1446].
107. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, opened for
signature Mar. 3, 1980, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1419 (1979) [hereinafter Nuclear Material Con-
vention]. The Convention, although ratified by the United States in 1982, is not yet in force.
Treaty Office, U.S. Department of State, in response to author's inquiry (May 29, 1986).
108. Nuclear Material Convention, supra note 107, art. 7.
109. Id. art. 9.
110. Id.
111. Id. art. 11.
112. Id. art. 10.
113. Id. art. 8.
114. Hearing on S. 1446, supra note 106, at 8-9 (statement of Richard T. Kennedy, Under
Secretary of State for Management and U.S. Representative to the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency).
115. As of May 1986, only 15 states had ratified the Convention, Treaty Office, U.S. De-




While it has been argued that the Convention is already in force for the
states that have ratified it, 116 such a claim may not be warranted; the test
will be whether those states will amend their national legislation to con-
form with the Convention's specific requirements for extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
8. The Multilateral Counterterrorist Conventions in Practice
Of the seven conventions just analyzed, only the convention relating to
nuclear material is not currently in force. The Tokyo and OAS Conven-
tions, however, are essentially of historical interest. The effectiveness in
practical terms of the remaining four is difficult to gauge. While com-
mercial hijackings have declined in number since the Hague Convention,
it is not clear that the Convention, rather than enhanced international
airport security, is to be credited with that decline. Moreover, extradi-
tion requests concerning offenses enumerated in the conventions are
likely to be made under bilateral extradition treaties, which often adopt
the language of the conventions.
Taken together, the Hague and Montreal Conventions have estab-
lished a theoretical framework for the assertion of national jurisdiction
over nearly every possible dangerous interference with commercial air
navigation. The New York Convention has created a context for similar
treatment of violence against internationally protected persons, and the
Hostages Convention has provided a jurisdictional framework to cover
political kidnapping.
Still, this network of international agreements has two very practical
shortcomings. The first is the failure of the international criminal law
system to deal with the most disturbing terrorist offense of all: the seem-
ingly random murder of internationally unprotected persons, targeted
merely because of their nationality or ethnic affiliation. Individual states
may assert national jurisdiction over such extraterritorial offenses, 117 but
there is no international agreement, in form or in fact, that such an asser-
116. See REPORT ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 5.
117. Article 8 of the Italian Penal Code, for example, posits jurisdiction over "political
crime[s]" by citizens and aliens, regardless of the situs of the crime. A common crime may be
deemed a political crime for this purpose if it was inspired, in whole or in part, by political
motives. THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE 3 (E. Wise trans. 1978). Israeli law also provides for
competence of domestic courts to try any person who has committed abroad an act which
would have been an offense if committed in Israel, if that act was intended to harm Israel, its
security, its property, its economy, or its transportation or communication links with other
countries. J. MURPHY, supra note 13, at 31. This legislation provided the jurisdictional basis
for Israel's 1973 prosecution of Faik Bulut, a Turkish citizen convicted of the offense of mem-
bership in the PLO in Lebanon and Syria. See Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdic-
tion Following Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent in International Law, 72 MICH. L.
REV. 1087 (1974); Note, Bringing the Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law Approach, 11 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 71, 76-77 (1978).
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tion may be the basis for the surrender of a fugitive. The second short-
coming is the dependence of the entire international counterterrorist
legal struture upon the aut dedere autjudicare principle. Where states
shirk their responsibility to extradite or to try, the system collapses.
And, as the following sections make clear, the decision of whether or not
to extradite political offenders may be fraught with complications.
C. United States Legislation in Response to International Terrorism
and the Counterterrorist Conventions
Besides encouraging the establishment of universal jurisdiction over
terrorist offenses, the global anti-terrorist conventions have been instru-
mental in promoting U.S. responses to the jurisdiction problem; they
have given U.S. lawmakers a theoretical framework for the liberation of
national criminal jurisdiction from the territorial principle, at least as to
the particular offenses which they cover.118 In response to the conven-
tions, the U.S. Congress has enacted substantially all the jurisdictional
measures which the agreements require; at present the subject-matter ju-
risdiction of U.S. federal courts over extraterritorial terrorist crimes can
be summarized by listing the offenses embraced by the conventions. Ju-
risdiction exists in nearly all cases of aircraft hijacking and other danger-
ous interference with civil aviation, as well as in most cases of violence
against internationally protected persons and officials of the United
States government. It extends to the taking of hostages and the wrongful
appropriation of or interference with nuclear material.
118. Although U.S. courts have traditionally espoused a strict territorial theory ofjurisdic-
tion, many have been willing in practice to extend territorial jurisdiction to comprehend extra-
territorial criminal acts that have effects within the country. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at
217. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 278 U.S. 593 (1927) (British subjects on British vessel on
the high seas were properly convicted of conspiracy to violate United States liquor laws);
United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980) (U.S. court had jurisdiction over offense
of possessing 26 tons of marijuana aboard a U.S. vessel on the high seas); United States v.
Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) (court had jurisdiction over
entire conspiracy, including extraterritorial acts of Jamaican co-conspirators who never en-
tered United States, when the object of the conspiracy was importation of marijuana into the
United States and a conspirator had committed an overt act in United States territory; Sachs v.
Gov't of Canal Zone, 176 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1949) (U.S. citizen was properly convicted of
criminal libel when he composed document in a foreign country but intended it for distribution
in United States territory). Furthermore, several U.S. cases have explicitly held that Congress
may extend the reach of national law to acts of U.S. citizens abroad under the protective or
nationality theories. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421 (1932); United States v. Kaercher, 720 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1983); Brulay v. United
States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967). Although Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), and McEl-
roy v. United States ex rel. Gagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960), held unconstitutional, at least in
time of peace, 10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1956), which subjects civilians serving with, employed by,
or accompanying the armed forces overseas to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the con-
stitutionally infirm aspect of § 802(11) was not the reach of U.S. jurisdiction but the extension
of military judicial procedures to civilians.
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To be sure, some of the U.S. legislation pertaining to extraterritorial
jurisdiction was enacted without regard to U.S. participation in the mul-
tilateral agreements outlined above. For example, in 1952 the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction law of the United States was
amended to cover aircraft belonging to the United States, its citizens, and
its corporations, while such aircraft are in flight over the high seas or
over waters of the United States. 119 The amendment was intended to
preclude the recurrence of an event like the 1950 dismissal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction of assault charges based upon conduct that
occurred aboard an airliner flying between San Juan and New York.120
In 1965, extraterritorial jurisdiction was extended to the killing or kid-
napping of, or assault upon, the President and other elected officials of
the executive branch, as well as over conspiracies and attempts to carry
out such crimes.12 1 Congress extended the same protection to itself in
1971,122 and to the Cabinet and Supreme Court in 1982.123
Nonetheless, most of the legislation aimed at gaining U.S. jurisdiction
over terrorists has been introduced in direct response to the conventions
examined above. The Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974,124 for example,
amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1948 to redefine "aircraft piracy"
along the lines of the Hague and Montreal Conventions, adding "intimi-
dation" to the means by which aircraft piracy could be committed within
the statute. 125 This Act, and its 1977 amendment, also modified the "spe-
cial aircraft jurisdiction of the United States" to conform generally to
the scope of jurisdiction required of contracting states by the Hague and
Montreal Conventions.126 Moreover, this legislation established U.S. ju-
risdiction over hijacking "outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the
United States," incorporating by specific reference hijackings that lack a
U.S. nexus other than the offender's eventual presence.127 This Act also
added a provision placing attempted hijacking under federal jurisdiction
should the failure of the attempt result in the plane's remaining on the
119. 18 U.S.C. § 7(5) (1982). Moreover, U.S. jurisdiction became extraterrestrial in 1981
when it was amended to include U.S. spacecraft in flight. 18 U.S.C. § 7(6) (1982).
120. United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1982). In 1982 the statute was amended to include appointed
members of the presidential and vice-presidential staffs.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1986).
123. Id.
124. Pub. L. No. 93-366, 49, 88 Stat. 409 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
125. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(i)(2) (1982). All other means of hijacking covered by the
Hague Convention were already prohibited by U.S. law.
126. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(38) (1982). The formula enacted is needlessly complicated, in
that it attempts to graft the Hague and Montreal Convention requirements onto preexisting
statutory language, instead of adopting them verbatim.
127. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(n) (1982).
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ground. 128 Together with a new prohibition against placing bombs or
incendiary devices aboard civil aircraft,129 this provision materially satis-
fies the Montreal Convention requirement for jurisdiction over offenses
that occur before takeoff.
In 1972, in response to the killing of Israeli Olympic athletes in Mu-
nich,130 Congress amended the United States Code to federalize the kid-
napping 13 1 and murder 132 of foreign officials and "official guests," a
provision that lent some precision to the vagueness of the OAS Conven-
tion. 33  Following the New York Convention, in 1976, Congress
amended the relevant U.S. statutes to include "internationally protected
persons" as a third category of potential victims given special protection.
Universal jurisdiction over crimes against such people, required implic-
itly by the OAS Convention134 and explicitly by the New York Conven-
tion,13 5 was adopted by the United States in 1976. U.S. jurisdiction thus
exists over offenses against "internationally protected persons" no matter
where the offenses occur, if the offender is later present within the United
States.' 3
6
In 1984, responding to the obligation imposed by the Hostages Con-
vention, Congress extended criminal jurisdiction over international hos-
tage-taking with the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.137 This
legislation defines hostage-taking 38 according to the provisions of the
Hostages Convention. Under the Act, the crime, "whether committed
inside or outside the United States," is justiciable in U.S. courts if either
the offender or a hostage is a national, if the government extorted is the
United States, or otherwise if the offender is found in the United States.
Purely domestic hostage-takings-those in which there is no interna-
128. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(i)(3) (1982).
129. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(1)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
130. J. MURPHY, supra note 13, at 23.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(4) (Supp. 11 1984).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (1982).
133. See supra text accompanying note 85.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1116(c) (1982). The precise meaning of this universal jurisdiction was
examined judicially in 1981 in the trial of a U.S. citizen for the murder of Congressman Leo J.
Ryan in Guyana. The defendant contended that, because he had been indicted while still in
Guyana, he had not been "present" in the United States and his indictment must be quashed.
The court agreed with this argument, but found that the grand jury properly exercised jurisdic-
tion over the offense based upon alternative theories, including effects within the territory,
protection of state interests, passive personality, and nationality. United States v. Layton, 509
F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972
(1981).
137. Pub. L. No. 98-473 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985)).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. III 1985).
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tional element and the entity compelled is not the U.S. government-are
covered by state law under this statute.1 39
Although the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Mate-
rial is not yet in force, the United States has already extended its jurisdic-
tional authority to deal with the international crimes created by the
agreement. 14° In addition to establishing jurisdiction over offenses
within U.S. territory,141 committed by U.S. nationals, 142 or committed by
offenders later found in the United States143-mandatory under the Con-
vention-Congress has extended jurisdiction over other offenses where
the United States is the exporter or importer of nuclear material in
transit, regardless of the national registration of the carrier or situs of the
offense.144
Moreover, in implementing its anti-nuclear terrorism law, the United
States went further than the Convention in proscribing certain other of-
fenses in order to "render the protection of nuclear material com-
plete." 145 For example, although the Convention is limited in scope to
the protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, 146 U.S. ju-
risdiction now comprehends unlawful interference with military nuclear
material if undertaken within U.S. territory 4 7 or by a U.S. national. 148
In late 1986, the United States went beyond the requirements of any of
the Conventions to bring within U.S. criminal jurisdiction all homicides,
attempts to commit homicide, or conspiracies to commit homicide of a
U.S. national outside the United States. 149 In so doing, it embraced for
the first time the passive personality theory of jurisdiction. However,
such legislation was really the only possible way for national law to reach
the seemingly random murder of ordinary persons who appear to have
no link with the terrorists' political goals except their U.S. nationality.
No prosecution under this statute may be undertaken without certifica-
tion by the Attorney General or his highest ranking subordinate that the
offense was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a govern-
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(2) (Supp. 111 1985). For the responses of some states to this
offense when it lacks an international character, see LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM,
supra note 18.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 831 (1982).
141. Id. § 831(c)(1). "Territory" includes the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
and special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. Id.
142. Id. § 831(c)(2).
143. Id. § 831(c)(3).
144. Id. § 831(c)(4).
145. H.R. REP. No. 624, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982).
146. Nuclear Material Convention, supra note 107, art. 2.
147. See supra note 141.
148. See supra note 142.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1987).
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ment or a civilian group. The death penalty is not an authorized punish-
ment under the statute.
The question naturally arises whether there are other fields of terrorist
endeavor toward which multilateral conventions and domestic statutory
reforms should be directed. Currently, U.S. jurisdiction does not appear
to reach several types of terrorist activities. For example, U.S. laws may
not reach such crimes as the hijacking of commercial vessels on the high
seas, armed attack upon passengers waiting in crowded airports, and the
use by terrorists of threats of deadly chemical or biological poisoning to
compel government action. Such shortcomings in U.S. jurisdiction must
be corrected if the United States hopes to combat terrorism effectively.
It appears, however, that the movement favoring the creation of new
international terrorist crimes may have run its course, at least for the
time being. The inability of the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protec-
tion of Nuclear Material to win quick ratification illustrates that, even
where the threat is logical and apparent, but not yet a common interna-
tional occurrence, the world community will be slow to consider itself
endangered and to act accordingly. In the absence of continued multilat-
eral progress, the best chance for necessary adjustments in international
jurisdiction lies in regional and bilateral agreements between states that
share certain characteristics making them susceptible to particular forms
of terrorist action. These common characteristics may include a rela-
tively high proportion of affluent international travelers, economic de-
pendence upon significant levels of international tourism, and an inability
to establish acceptable security near vulnerable targets because of high
societal expectations of individual privacy. Of course, if no regional or
bilateral progress is made, the United States will need to extend its juris-
diction unilaterally.
II. Jurisdiction over the Person of the Offender
The establishment by an offended state of competence to adjudicate an
offense solves only half the jurisdictional problem associated with inter-
national terrorism. The offended state must also obtain jurisdiction over
the person of the alleged offender, someone who is likely to be beyond the
reach of state law. Extradition is the ordinary mechanism for exercising




A. Extradition and the Terrorist
1. General Principles of Extradition
Extradition has been defined as "the process by which persons charged
with or convicted of a crime against the law of a State and found in a
foreign State are returned by the latter to the former for trial or punish-
ment." 50 The states involved are referred to as the "requesting" and
"requested" state, respectively. The formal request, a "requisition,"
names the person claimed by the requesting state. 51
Formal procedures for the transfer of fugitives between sovereigns date
from the time of the Egyptian, Assyro-Babylonian, and early Chinese
civilizations. 152 However, modern scientific developments in mass trans-
portation and communications have made it easier for criminals to seek
refuge in foreign countries,153 a fact which is reflected in the increasing
numbers of aircraft hijackings since the early 1970's.' 54 As a result, ex-
tradition has become a growth industry in recent years. While the
United States generally received fewer than ten international extradition
requisitions per year prior to 1970, this number grew during the last dec-
ade, reaching 150 in 1979, and 218 in 1980.155
No rule of customary international law requires a state to comply with
an extradition request; the obligation to extradite, if any, arises purely
out of prior bilateral agreement, usually in the form of an extradition
treaty.156 Some states, however, will extradite in the absence of a
treaty,157 while others will not.158 Along these lines, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held not only that there is no duty to extradite absent a
treaty,59 but also that no authority exists to extradite under U.S. law
except by legislation or treaty. 160
150. 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 727 (1942); see also Harvard
Research, supra note 25, at 21.
151. Id.
152. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 1.
153. Id. at 37.
154. See supra note 53.
155. Extradition Act of 1981: Hearing on S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1981) (testimony of Michael Abbell, Director, Office of Interna-
tional Affairs, Criminal Division, Dept. of Justice) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1639].
156. J. MURPHY, supra note 13, at 36. For a summary of the disputes among international
law publicists on this point, see Blakesley, Extradition Between France and the United States:
An Exercise in Comparative and International Law, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 653, 656 n.6
(1980).
157. France exemplifies this "continental theory and practice." Blakesley, id. at 656.
158. Belgium, for example, will extradite only under a treaty. Report of the Law Libra-
rian, Library of Congress, reprinted in Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 5227
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 439
(1982).
159. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840); see also United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
160. Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
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The United States is party to the most extensive network of bilateral
extradition treaties, some of them now outdated, in the world. 16 It con-
siders itself confined as a matter of policy as well as law to extraditing
only to those states with which it has concluded such a treaty. 162 Thus,
although the multilateral anti-terrorist conventions previously discussed
contain as a central element mechanisms for extraditing offenders, the
United States declines to recognize them as proper bases for
extradition. 163
Despite its dependence upon the specific terms of individual treaties,
U.S. extradition practice is characterized by a number of standard provi-
sions. Restrictions upon double jeopardy, for example, appear in nearly
all U.S. extradition treaties, 164 even those concluded with countries in
which foreign conviction is not a bar to prosecution on the same facts. 165
The principle of double criminality, requiring that the offense on which
the requisition is based be a crime in both states party to the request,
provides another limitation, 166 as does the principle of speciality, which
prohibits the prosecution by the requesting state of the person claimed
for any offense other than that for which he is extradited. 167 The most
significant limitation of all, however, is provided by the political offense
exception.168
2. The Theory Behind the Political Offense Exception to Extradition
Commentators have pointed out that, although the existence of an ex-
ception from extradition for political offenders is a matter of interna-
tional consensus, there is still a great deal of debate as to its practical
application and theoretical underpinnings.169 Some commentators have
described the political offense exception as a "concept ... vitally related
to the protection of human rights."'170 Yet the relationship between the
161. Recent Developments-International Agreements: Two Treaties Between the United
States and Italy, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 601, 606 (1985).
162. J. MURPHY, supra note 13, at 43.
163. Id. Professor Bassiouni has urged reversal of this policy. Hearing on S. 1639, supra
note 155, at 21.
164. Id. at 6.
165. See, e.g., Blakesley, supra note 156, at 695-96 (discussing restriction in former
France-US treaty).
166. Schultz, The Great Framework of Extradition and Asylum, in 2 TREATISE ON INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 309, 313 (1973).
167. Blakesley, supra note 156, at 706-07.
168. Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law and Practice, in INTER-
NATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES, supra note 16, at 398, 399.
169. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADI-
TION ix (1980).
170. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law,
48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1226 (1962). "It is ... plain that the reluctance of governments to




political offense exception and human rights is open to question. After
all, a state may surrender an accused political criminal without offending
any rule of international human rights law. 171 Even where a treaty does
not require the extradition of political offenders, these offenders may be
extradited by a state for foreign policy reasons. 172 Thus the human
rights rationale does not provide a convincing explanation for the polit-
ical offense exception. The exception is designed primarily to promote
the rights of states, not individuals. 173
Alternatively, some observers have argued that the exception is a
means by which states can remain neutral in the internal power struggles
of their neighbors. 174 Thus, the decision of whether or not to exercise the
exception is, in large part, a matter of foreign policy. But this rationale
does not accord sufficient weight to the fact that the exception is enforced
by the judiciary, along with or in place of the executive, in many
states. 175 Finally, there are those who believe that the citizens of a state
are entitled to participate in political activity to change their government,
in spite of prohibitions against such activity under most repressive re-
gimes. 176 In other words, they contend that political offenses are not
inherently criminal because they arise out of legitimate social rather than
personal motives. 177 The political offense exception, however, makes no
theoretical distinction between rebels against oppressive states and polit-
ical offenders in liberal democracies, where alternative means of govern-
mental change are available. Moreover, reliance upon the motivation of
the offender tends to overlook the harmful effects of political violence on
individuals, as well as the threat such violence poses to international
order.
There is further disagreement as to precisely what constitutes a polit-
ical offense falling within the exception. There is no question 78 about
offenses that are directed against the state and possess none of the ele-
the fate of unsuccessful rebels and from the demands of a world community vitally committed
to the protection of human rights everywhere." Id. at 1238.
171. Harvard Research, supra note 25, at 66, 110.
172. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 935 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
918 (1949).
173. See Garcia-Mora, supra note 170, at 1227-28.
174. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 169, at 3.
175. "Purely executive decisions with respect to extradition are rather exceptional today."
Id. at 38.
176. Cantrell, The Political Offense Exception in International Extradition: A Comparison
of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 777, 782
(1977).
177. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 169, at 3; Argentina v. Camporas, LIV Revista
de Derecho, Jurisprudencia y Ciencias Sociales y Gaceta de los Tribunales 197 (Supreme
Court of Chile 1957), summarized in Report of the Law Librarian, supra note 158, at 446-47.
178. See Bassiouni, supra note 168, at 405-08.
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ments of an ordinary crime, 79 including treason,18 0 sedition, and espio-
nage.18' To deal with ambiguous crimes that contain both political and
common elements, however, commentators have created a confusing ar-
ray of relative, mixed, complex, and connected offenses.' 8 2 The "com-
plex" and "connected" classification system has lost its significance; most
modern writers speak only of purely political offenses and related, or rel-
ative, political offenses. Related or relative offenses consist of all those
common crimes which are committed for a political purpose and have
political consequences or occur in a political context.
8 3
Most extradition treaties reject the extradition of fugitives charged
with or convicted of relative political offenses.' 8 4 Given the open-ended
definition of these offenses, and the freedom of each state to establish
their scope, it is not surprising that "[t]he difficulty of obtaining a com-
mon definition of 'political offense' in extradition matters is notorious
...."185 In addition, the debate continues over who should be responsi-
ble for settling this confusion, the legislature or the judiciary.
3. Making the Political Offense Decision: Judicial Interpretation or
Executive Discretion
The institutional arrangements by which states make political offense
determinations are extraordinarily diverse. Purely executive systems,
once the general rule, are rare today. 186 They still exist, however, in Ec-
uador, Spain, Canada, and Germany.1' 7 Purely judicial systems are
found in Brazil,188 Chile, 189 France, 190 and Israel. 191 In the United
179. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 512 (7th Cir. 1981).
180. Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison exparte Kolczynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540, 547
(1954) (opinion of I. Cassels); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 935 (Ist Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
181. Garcia-Mora, supra note 170, at 1237; Cantrell, supra note 176, at 780; Harvard
Research, supra note 25, at 112.
182. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 169, at 108.
183. Id. at 108; see also Bassiouni, supra note 168, at 408-12. In a relative political offense,
the common crime is so connected with a political act that the entire offense is regarded as
political. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 512 (quoting Garcia-Mora, supra note 170, at 1230-31).
For a more thorough discussion of pure and relative political offenses in a recent case, see the
magistrate's extradition opinion in Ex rel. Mackin, reprinted in Hearing on S. 1639, supra note
155, at 140, 162-65.
184. Garcia-Mora, supra note 170, at 1239.
185. Costello, supra note 16, at 490.
186. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 169, at 38.
187. Id. Apparently, however, a Spanish executive decision that the exception does not
apply may be appealed to a criminal court. Report of the Law Librarian, supra note 158, at
465-66.
188. Id. at 441.
189. Id. at 444-45.
190. Id. at 448-55.




Kingdom, the Secretary of State makes the political offense determina-
tion, with review upon habeas corpus by a court. 192
In most countries, the decision is made by the executive, with the
assistance of an advisory opinion by a judicial body. In Italy, 193 Aus-
tria,194 and Switzerland, 195 a judicial opinion to the effect that the offense
is not extraditable is binding on the executive. In Belgium, 196 India,197
Japan,198 Peru, 199 and Mexico, 200 by contrast, a judicial opinion that the
offense in question is political need only be taken into consideration by
the executive. However, as a practical matter, in the latter states the
executive rarely overrules a judicial determination of non-
extraditability.
20
United States extradition practice is largely codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3181-3195, which contemplate a requisition made by a foreign sover-
eign to the Secretary of State. After the State Department approves the
request, it forwards papers to the U.S. attorney in the district in which
the person claimed may be found.20 2 The U.S. attorney files for an arrest
warrant with "any justice or judge of the United States, or any magis-
trate, ' or any judge of a state court of record and of general jurisdic-
tion.203 If a warrant is issued, a hearing is held to consider the sufficiency
of the evidence to make out an offense "under the provisions of the
proper treaty or convention. '"204
Neither party has a right to appeal from an adverse extradition deci-
sion, but the person claimed may seek a writ of habeas corpus. 20 5 The
scope of habeas corpus review is limited, however, with due deference
paid to the magistrate's decision. 20 6 If, on the other hand, extradition is
192. Id. at 485-86.
193. A judicial decision that the offense is not political, however, does not require the
Minister of Justice to accede to the extradition request. Id. at 461-62.
194. The Federal Minister of Justice has the same discretion as his Italian counterpart in
cases in which the court does not prohibit extradition. Id. at 436.
195. After the Federal Tribunal finds that the offense for which extradition is requested is
not a political one, the Federal Council may still disapprove extradition if it believes that the
person claimed will nonetheless be investigated or prosecuted for political reasons. Id. at 477.
196. Id. at 439-40; C. VAN DEN WUINGAERT, supra note 169, at 38-39.
197. Report of the Law Librarian, supra note 158, at 480-81.
198. C. VAN DEN WUINGAERT, supra note 169, at 38-39.
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also Report of the Law Librarian, supra note 158, at 463-64.
201. C. VAN DEN WUINGAERT, supra note 169, at 38-39.
202. This procedure is summarized in Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 508.
203. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982).
204. Id. The last two words are interesting in light of U.S. policy to proceed with extradi-
tion requests only under bilateral treaties, and not under multilateral anti-terrorist conven-
tions. See supra text accompanying notes 162-63.
205. Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 155, at 3 (statement of Daniel McGovern).
206. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920); Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 508-09
(1896); David v. Attorney General, 699 F.2d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1983) (it was proper for the
same judge to preside at appellant's extradition hearing and at his habeas corpus hearing);
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denied, the Secretary of State has been permitted "to shop for a more
receptive magistrate. ' 20 7 In a recent case, a district court questioned
this practice of seeking "unlimited repetitions" of unsuccessful extradi-
tion hearings; the court asked whether such behavior "comports with the .
dignity of the United States Attorney's office."
'208
Like the system in use in most countries, the U.S. system can be char-
acterized as mixed executive-judicial; the United States, however, is unu-
sual in that it refers the political offense issue automatically from the
executive to the judiciary for final decision. 20 9 Although this deference
to judicial decision-making has been criticized as having "no particu-
larly apparent reason" behind it,21o it has been recognized by U.S. law at
least since the 1894 case of In re Ezeta.
211
The U.S. statutory arrangement has been the focus of considerable
controversy for much of the present decade.21 2 For example, the Senate
version of the Extradition Act of 1981, developed with the cooperation of
both the State and Justice Departments, 21 3 sought to place all responsi-
bility for the political offense determination with the Secretary of State
with no possibility of judicial review. 214 Although this approach was fa-
vored by both the Carter and Reagan Administrations, it met with "a
Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036
(1980); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 508.
207. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 516; In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
208. United States v. Doherty, 615 F. Supp. 755, 760 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The judge then
put off the issue, stating: "But I will leave that determination for, say, judge number 14 on the
list." Id.
209. It should be noted that there exists substantial room for executive discretion in cur-
rent U.S. practice but that it operates only in the direction of denying extradition. That is,
should the administration wish, it may declare the claimed person a refugee-one who is un-
able to return to the country of his nationality because of a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of political opinion-and grant the person asylum on that basis. In a recent case, the
Supreme Court held that an applicant is entitled to consideration of his request for asylum
upon demonstration of such a largely subjective fear. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct.
1207 (1987).
210. Hannay, Legislative Reform of U.S. Extradition Statutes: Plugging the Terrorists
Loophole, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 53, 55 (1983).
211. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (holding that, where the persons claimed were high-rank-
ing Salvadoran army officers charged with murder and other crimes in the course of their
unsuccessful resistance to a revolution, the magistrate properly determined that their offenses
were political in nature). An extradition hearing before a judicial officer is apparently not
required as a matter of constitutional due process. See Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 686
(5th Cir. 1969) (the statute's grant of extradition authority exclusively to the Governor of the
Canal Zone was not unconstitutional, in that due process requirements were satisfied by the
availability of habeas corpus).
212. In Eain v. Wilkes, the United States argued that the judiciary's historic jurisdiction
over political offenses was anomolous and improper, but the court swept the argument aside.
641 F.2d at 513. Federal courts have unanimously rejected the argument that the political
offense exception is a nonjusticiable political question. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 782-
88 (9th Cir. 1986). On legislative proposals for reform, see generally Hannay, supra note 210.
213. Id. at 53.
214. Id. at 61 n.27.
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barrage of criticism... from civil liberties groups who.., perceived the
legislation as a direct assault on due process. ' 215 Because of this opposi-
tion, the Act was never passed.
Supporters of executive discretion have argued that "it is impossible-
and ultimately improper-for a court to try to define what constitutes a
'political offense' by means of some hard and fast rule or test .... [The
exception] was created to give the requested state flexibility in responding
to extradition requests . . . "216 A State Department representative de-
scribed the problem in this way at a recent congressional hearing:
[A] public court proceeding is not an appropriate or desirable forum for a
careful analysis of a foreign state's intentions or political system. Rather, a
decision on the 'political offense' exception is, as the name suggests, ines-
capably political in nature and inextricably intertwined with the conduct of
foreign relations .... The potentially crippling effect of [judicial] decisions
on foreign affairs is particularly great where it could compromise U.S. ef-
forts to combat international terrorism. 217
Professor Bassiouni, however, has suggested a less far-reaching reform.
He advised a congressional committee to set up legislative guidelines for
the judiciary or, alternatively, to enact legislative guidelines for the Secre-
tary of State to apply with some mechanism for review.218 Professor Bas-
siouni's first proposal-to impose a legislative definition upon the
existing judicial mechanism-seems more in keeping with the U.S. legal
tradition than the State Department's proposal and would require a less
disruptive change in extradition procedure. In addition, it would elimi-
nate the greatest single drawback of the present arrangement: a dis-
turbing unpredictability in magistrates' holdings. Elected representatives
would be able to fine-tune the system on a continuing basis, without the
interference caused by subjective changes in judicial standards.
Professor Bassiouni's second proposal-to entrust extradition deci-
sions to the executive while leaving available habeas corpus review to the
person claimed-also has merit. This change would mirror, in effect, the
present English system. It would allow the executive to maintain con-
trol over day-to-day foreign relations, but would retain judicial supervi-
sion of individual cases. Such an arrangement would also satisfy
215. Id. at 61-62.
216. Hearing on S. 1639, supra note 155, at 50-51 (statement of William H. Hannay).
217. Id. at 4 (statement of Daniel McGovern, Deputy Legal Adviser to the State
Department).
218. Id. at 21 (testimony of M. Cherif Bassiouni). Advocates of executive discretion op-
pose such guidelines because they may also be applied to those whose violence is seen as ad-
vancing U.S. foreign policy, or whom we perceive as admirable rebels in legitimate causes. See
Hannay, supra note 210, at 64.
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constitutional requirements of due process in a way that purely executive
discretion would not.
219
The debate over the proper extradition standard will undoubtedly con-
tinue. Indeed, the imposition of judicial standards governing the political
offense determination is a feature of both the proposed International Ter-
rorism Control Act of 1985220 and the recently ratified Supplementary
Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom.
221
4. The Substantive Law of the Political Offense Exception: Civil Law
and Common Law Approaches
The concept of the political offense as a limitation on extradition is
relatively recent. The political offense exception was not introduced until
1834, when France began incorporating it in treaties.222 Since that time,
the exception has become increasingly common in European extradition
treaties.
As the exception developed, a rough distinction in the treatment of the
"relative" political offense emerged between civil law and common law
countries. The former have paid more attention to the subjective motiva-
tions of the offender,223 while the latter have focused more on objective
features of the offense or its context. 224 To be sure, civil law approaches
vary. German courts use the more objective standard, 225 while French
courts have been considered more subjective.226 France, for example, re-
fused a U.S. request for the extradition of two hijackers in 1975 on polit-
ical offense grounds because, in addition to extorting $500,000 from the
owner of the aircraft, the hijackers had made vague references to their
219. For a discussion of these due process requirements, see, e.g., Sayne v. Shipley, 418
F.2d 679 (1969).
220. See supra note 149.
221. S. Doc. No. 8, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The Senate approved ratification on July
17, 1986, by a vote of 87-10. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1986, at Al, col. 6; 44 CONG. Q. 1608
(1986).
222. Volger, Perspectives on Extradition and Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND POLITICAL CRIMES, supra note 16, at 391-92. For a concise summary of the political
offense exception, see C. VAN DER WIJNGAERT, supra note 169, at 4-18.
223. Bassiouni, supra note 168, at 421-30, discerns a further distinction between the
French "injured rights" theory and the "political motivation" theory which characterizes the
approach of much of the rest of Europe. He notes, however, that French courts use injured-
rights analysis as part of a broader motivational consideration. Id. at 421-22. Professor Gar-
cia-Mora makes this point as well. Garcia-Mora, supra note 170, at 1249-50.
224. C. VAN DEN WUINGAERT, supra note 169, at 109.
225. See id. at 120-26.
226. Id. But see Carbonneau, French Judicial Perspectives on the Extradition of Transna-
tional Terrorists and the Political Offense Exception, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMI-
NAL LAW 66, 76 (R. Lillich ed. 1981) (arguing that precise characterization of the French




opposition to the Vietnam war and support for Angela Davis.227 It ap-
pears, however, that French courts have recently been using a mixed sub-
jective-objective analysis, 228 especially where the offense in question has
caused the death of innocents.
229
Switzerland is a civil law country whose political offense jurisprudence
has elicited praise from commentators. Its approach is based on the
Swiss Extradition Act of 1982, which makes unextraditable crimes that
are "primarily political." The guiding principle, "proportionality," has
been developed and clarified by the courts. First, the offense must have
been committed in the course of a struggle for political power.230 Sec-
ond, the political element of the act must predominate over its common
crime aspect.231 This idea was described in one case as "the principle
that the relation between the purpose and the means adopted for its
achievement must be such that the ideals connected with the purpose are
sufficiently strong to excuse, if not justify, the injury to private property,
and to make the offender appear worthy of asylum. ' 232 As a result, ex-
tremely serious crimes may automatically be disproportionate to their
political ends; homicide in particular must be justified as a last resort.
233
The common law approach is illustrated by the landmark English case
of In re Castioni.234 A number of citizens of a Swiss canton revolted
against their government, seized an arsenal, and stormed the municipal
palace. Castioni, armed with a revolver, was among the first to enter. A
member of the State Council resisted their entrance and was killed.
There was no evidence that Castioni had any previous knowledge of the
victim. The court held that any homicide that Castioni might have com-
mitted was "done in furtherance of ... a political rising, or a dispute
227. Although the decision of the Cour d'appel in Paris is unpublished, the facts are de-
scribed in J. MURPHY, supra note 13, at 53. The U.S. memorandum of law submitted in the
case, as well as a U.S. note delivered to the French government as a result of the decision, are
reprinted in E. MCDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 168-75 (1975). In fact, the United States did not abandon its 14-year effort to extradite
the pair and, in a little-reported conclusion, the French court reversed its decision with respect
to one of the hijackers, Willie Roger Holder, in July 1986. See Raleigh News and Observer,
July 28, 1986, at 2A, col. 4.
228. See Carbonneau, supra note 226, at 76.
229. C. VAN DEN WUNGAERT, supra note 169, at 121-26 (1980). Still, the courts, relying
on subjective analysis of the offender's motivations, are subject to criticism for their failure to
consider the possible political hostility of the requesting state toward the person claimed. Id.
at 126.
230. Id. at 127.
231. Garcia-Mora, supra note 170, at 1254-56.
232. In re Kavic (1952), Int'l L. Rep. 371, 374 (No. 80) (Switz.).
233. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 169, at 129. In the Argentine case of In re
Bohme, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1968), the court implies a proportionality criterion when it
states "extradition will not be denied ... where we are dealing with cruel or immoral acts
which clearly shock the conscience of civilized peoples."
234. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149 (1890).
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between two parties in the State as to which is to have the government in
its hands, '235 and was therefore a political offense within the meaning of
the Extradition Act of 1870.236 The Castioni "political incidence" theory
created a two-part standard. First, it required that a political revolt or
disturbance be in progress. Second, the act for which extradition was
sought had to have been incidental to that disturbance.
237
The case of In re Meunier further defined the common law stan-
dard.238 In that case, a self-proclaimed anarchist was sought by France
for committing a series of bombings. The court found that Meunier's
offenses fell outside the protection of the political offense exception in
that "the party with whom the accused is identified ... is the enemy of
all Governments. Their efforts are directed primarily against the general
body of citizens. '239 After Meunier, to fall under the political offense
exception a political disturbance had to be directed at replacing an ex-
isting government with a new one, and not merely at promoting social
chaos. 24
o
The political incidence test was loosened considerably by the holding
in the more recent Kolczynski case,241 in which an English court con-
fronted the implications of modern totalitarianism. A group of seven
Polish seamen mutinied and brought their trawler into port in England,
seeking political asylum. A brother of one of them had defected from
Poland while the trawler was at sea. His defection resulted in increas-
ingly close observation of the defector's brother and his friends by the
vessel's party secretary. The men, believing that they would be punished
by the state upon their return to Poland, decided to defect also and thus
initiated the mutiny. In resisting their extradition, counsel for the sailors
admitted that "at the present time there is no active political opposition
to the Communist Party in Poland. ' 242 Thus, if Castioni and Meunier
were strictly applied, the offenses would be held nonpolitical. The court
therefore looked behind the crimes in the formal requisition, finding that
"if [the defectors] should be extradited they may well only be tried for
235. Id. at 156 (opinion of Denman, J.).
236. 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52.
237. Bassiouni, supra note 168, at 412; C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 169, at I 11.
238. [1894] 2 Q.B. 415 (1894),
239. Id. at 419.
240. Professor Garcia-Mora criticized the Castioni-Meunier standard as "too narrow to
afford adequate protection to deserving individuals" because the contemporary political of-
fender may act alone, without benefit of an ongoing state of insurrection. Garcia-Mora, supra
note 170, at 1242. The point is well taken that one should not be denied protection because of
the absence of a state of insurrection, but the argument that Meunier denies protection to the
person acting alone is unconvincing. Meunier's qualification of Castioni was a positive step in
its limitation of protection to genuine revolutionaries and refusal to extend exemption to the
individual for whom violence itself is the goal.
241. Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison exparte Kolczynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540 (1954).
242. Id. at 544.
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the offences for which their extradition is requested, but they will be pun-
ished as for an offence of a political character, and that offence is treason
in going over to the capitalist enemies. '2 43 Chief Judge Lord Goddard
added, "[t]he evidence about the law prevalent in the Republic of Poland
today shows that it is necessary, if only for reasons of humanity, to give a
wider and more generous meaning to the words we are now construing
"244
Kolczynski represented a liberalized, ad hoc, common law approach to
the political offense exception that took into account all relevant facts,
including the nature of the system which proposed to punish the person
claimed. 245 Its effect was soon blunted, however, beginning with the
House of Lords' 1962 decision in Schtraks v. Government of Israel.
246
The case concerned a Jewish fundamentalist who had allegedly kid-
napped his nephew from the boy's parents in Israel and brought him to
Britain for the purpose of preventing his secular education. The role of
religion in education was a sensitive political issue in Israel at the time,
and this particular case aroused debates in the Knesset.247 Although the
formal charges were child-stealing and perjury, Schtraks contended that
he committed these offenses in a political context. The House of Lords
found that the political disturbance in the case fell short of Castioni stan-
dards and extradited Schtraks, but they failed to clarify further the
meaning of "political offense" under Castioni.
Tsu-Tzai Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison,248 the most recent
English case of consequence on the political offense issue, did not adopt
the liberalized approach of Kolczynski, but, unlike Schtraks, it did ex-
pand the scope of Castioni. Cheng was a Taiwanese dissident who at-
tempted to assassinate the vice-president of that country during the
latter's visit to New York. Cheng then fled to Sweden, from which the
United States sought his extradition. Applying a proportionality analy-
sis, the Swedish Supreme Court noted that "the fact that an act has a
political motivation is not enough to make it a political crime .... espe-
cially when we are dealing with the kind of crimes that generally are
considered to be the most heinous, such as murder and the like."' 249 The
court unanimously permitted his extradition. On his way to the United
States Cheng was hospitalized in England, where he resisted extradition
once again. Adding to Castioni what has become known as the "at odds"
243. Id. at 548 (opinion of Cassels, J.).
244. Id. at 551 (opinion of Goddard, C.J.).
245. See Cantrell, supra note 176, at 786-87; R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 14, at 79.
246. [1962] 3 All E.R. 529.
247. Id. at 534-35.
248. [1973] 2 All E.R. 204.
249. Report of the Law Librarian, supra note 158, at 468.
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test,250 the House of Lords allowed him to be extradited again by ruling
that the political offense exception only applied if the government re-
questing extradition was the one against which the political offense had
been directed.
5. The Political Offense Exception Under U.S. Law
United States treatment of the political offense question has been char-
acterized by a rather mechanical application of Castioni.251 In testimony
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Professor Bassiouni de-
scribed U.S. policy as follows:
Historically the U.S. courts have recognized that for the application of the
relative political offense exception the context must be one of war, insurrec-
tion, or civil strife; that the individual engages in an act of violence against
the State or its political institutions or structure; and that there is a logical
nexus between the motives and intentions of the individual and the target
that he selects, excluding, of course, international crimes.
252
Reliance on Castioni's political incidence test by U.S. courts appears to
have originated in the 1894 case of In re Ezeta.253 The Ezeta court dis-
cussed Castioni at length 254 before concluding that the Salvadoran of-
ficers before it were political offenders, having allegedly committed
otherwise common crimes in the course of their unsuccessful resistance
against the overthrow of their government in "a political uprising. ' 255
Since Ezeta, however, the courts have failed to produce a workable
doctrine. Rigid adherence to the political uprising requirement has pro-
duced conflicting results and, for the most part, has reduced the analysis
of individual cases to a formalism that has impeded the development of
political offense law in the United States. The disparate outcomes of sev-
eral recent cases illustrate the problem.
The first of these is In re McMullen,256 which concerned a British
army deserter accused of bombing a military barracks in Yorkshire. At
his extradition hearing, the defendant argued that the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA), of which he was a member, had directed the
bombing. The government contended that the bombing was personally
motivated and unrelated to any PIRA activities. The magistrate dis-
missed the government's position as without merit in view of the Irish
250. See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 169, at 113-16.
251. Hearing on S. 1639, supra note 155, at 56-60 (statement of William H. Hannay).
252. Id. at 25 (statement of Professor M. Bassiouni).
253. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
254. Id. at 998-99.
255. Id. at 1002.




"political disturbance, with terrorist activity spanning a long period of
time," and found further that McMullen's offense was "a crime inciden-
tal to and formed as a part of a political disturbance, uprising or insur-
rection and in furtherance thereof. '257 The magistrate refused
extradition.
The second major U.S. political offense case of the decade, Escobedo v.
United States,258 concerned an attack by U.S. citizens upon the Cuban
consul and an associate in Mexico City, resulting in the associate's death.
The alleged assailants fled to the United States after their failed attack.
Mexico charged that they had planned to kidnap the consul and release
him in exchange for political prisoners held by Cuba. The Fifth Circuit,
on appeal of denial of habeas corpus, observed that the prisoners claimed
the protection of the political offense exception without contending that
they acted in the course of a violent political insurrection, and therefore
rejected the claim.
259
Like McMullen, the third case, In re Mackin,260 involved a member of
the PIRA. Mackin was charged with attempted murder and wounding
with intent to do grievous bodily harm; the offense arose out of an armed
assault upon a British soldier in Northern Ireland. The magistrate used a
three-part analysis in deciding the applicability of the political offense
exception and concluded that: (1) there was "an ongoing political upris-
ing of sufficient severity to satisfy the first prong of the political offense
exception"; 261 (2) Mackin was a member of the uprising group, the
PIRA, and acted not out of personal ill will toward the victim but in
accord with political goals; 262 and (3) Mackin's act was in furtherance of
the uprising.263 The United States appealed the Mackin denial of extradi-
tion, but the Court of Appeals found itself without jurisdiction to decide
more than that the magistrate had acted within her jurisdiction.264
While some federal courts have tried to be innovative and flexible in
applying the political offense exception, their success has been hampered
by ultimate reliance on the traditional political uprising standard.265 For
257. Id. at 295.
258. 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980).
259. Id. at 1104.
260. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), reprinted in Hearing on S. 1639, supra note 155, at
140.
261. Id. at 222.
262. Id. at 230.
263. Id. at 236-37, relying in part upon the requesting state's intention to try Mackin
under extraordinary procedures as a terrorist.
264. Matter of Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
265. Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896), the Supreme Court's only pronouncement on
the political exception issue, also advocated a more ad hoc approach. The case arose from a
raid on a Mexican town by an armed band. The Court reversed a finding that the offenses
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example, in Eain v. Wilkes,266 a U.S. magistrate found that the crime of
the plaintiff, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization accused
of exploding a bomb during a "youth day" rally in the Israeli city of
Tiberias, was not unextraditable under the political offense exception.
Eain then sought a writ of habeas corpus.267 On appeal the Seventh Cir-
cuit relied upon In re Meunier and Ornelas v. Ruiz268 to find that Eain's
offense was directed not against the Israeli government but against its
citizenry; thus, it could not be incidental to, or in the course of, any
political disturbance then in progress in Israel.
In Matter of Doherty,269 the United Kingdom sought extradition of a
person convicted of murder, attempted murder, and illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition, and charged with further offenses related to
his escape from prison while awaiting sentencing. The offenses for which
PIRA member Doherty had already been tried arose out of an exchange
of gunfire in Belfast, Northern Ireland, between British soldiers and
members of the PIRA.270 In denying extradition, the court considered
the history of political violence in Ireland, as well as the organizational
structure of the PIRA, and found that the case presented "the assertion
of the political offense exception in its most classic form. '271 The judge
did add, however, that British use of "Diplock courts," which employ
special procedures for the trials of alleged PIRA members and the exist-
ence of which was an influential factor in the Mackin finding of political
incidence, 272 did not establish presumptively that the crimes they tried
were by nature political.273 He also noted, in dicta, that no conduct vio-
lative of international law could be protected by the political offense
exception. 274
The most recent of these U.S. cases, Quinn v. Robinson,275 presented
the most interesting, though ultimately unsatisfying, analysis. The per-
son claimed was accused of the murder of a London constable and con-
spiracy to cause explosions by means of bombs mailed to various
were political in nature, deferring to an opinion by the Secretary of State in a companion case
that the political character of the raid was contradicted by the raiders' immediate retreat with
their booty into Texas, when they had already defeated the only government military forces in
the vicinity capable of hindering their further advance into Mexican territory. Id. at 511.
266. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
267. Id. at 507.
268. See supra note 265.
269. 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd sub nom. U.S. v. Doherty, 782 F.2d 491 (2d
Cir. 1986).
270. Id. at 272.
271. Id. at 276.
272. See supra note 263.
273. 599 F. Supp. at 276-77.
274. Id. at 274-75.
275. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
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prominent civilians in England or left in public places in London. A
magistrate found Quinn, a U.S. citizen and avowed member of the
PIRA, eligible for extradition. The magistrate held that while there had
been an uprising in England at the time of the offenses, Quinn proved
neither that he belonged to the group in revolt nor that the acts alleged
were incidental to the uprising. A district court reversed on habeas
corpus. Applying a more relaxed standard, the court found that the
bombings and attempted bombings were intended to modify British poli-
cies in Northern Ireland, and that the consequent harm to civilians was
merely a by-product of these actions. The murder of the constable, the
court found, although committed during Quinn's successful attempt to
evade personal arrest in the United Kingdom, was also incidental to the
uprising in that it prevented British discovery of the bomb factory.276
On appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel split three ways. The three opinions,
each pointing toward a different judicial resolution of the conflict, encap-
sulate the present confusing state of the law covering the political offense
exception.
Judge Reinhardt, writing the court's principal opinion, grounded his
decision solidly on the "ideologically neutral" 277 political incidence test.
He argued that the holding in Eain v. Wilkes that particularly heinous
acts fall outside the exception's protection constitutes judicial trespass
into the field of foreign policy: "the tactics that are used in such internal
political struggles are simply irrelevant to the question whether the polit-
ical offense exception is applicable. '278
In a searching examination of the political incidence test, Judge Rein-
hardt found two inherent limits to the political violence tolerated by the
extradition law. First, he found that the "uprising" requirement allowed
the exception to become operable only when the revolt in question at-
tracted "sufficient adherents to create the requisite amounts of turmoil,"
and when the fugitives were involved in acts designed to produce funda-
mental political change. 279 Second, he discerned a geographic limitation
on the exception that is also inherent in the "uprising" requirement:
"the term 'uprising' refers to a revolt by indigenous people against their
own government or an occupying power .... [The political offense ex-
ception] was not designed to protect.., the exportation of violence and
276. Neither the magistrate's nor the district court's opinion is published. The facts of the
case and its prior history appear in detail in id. at 783-86.
277. Id. at 804.
278. Id. at 805.
279. Id. at 807 (citing Escobedo v. United States, 673 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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strife to other locations-even to the homeland of an oppressor
nation." 2
0
Judge Duniway, concurring, rejected the geographic limitation posited
by Judge Reinhardt, fearing that narrowing the scope of the political of-
fense exception in this way would prove too cumbersome for U.S. courts
to follow. What if, for example, a Nicaraguan contra sank a vessel oper-
ated on the high seas by the Sandinista government and then sought ref-
uge in the United States? 281 The United States would be compelled, as a
matter of law, to extradite, but foreign policy considerations would mili-
tate strongly against this result. Judge Reinhardt's failure to anticipate
such a possibility led Judge Duniway to favor the Eain v. Wilkes ap-
proach, which focuses instead on the tactics and methods used by the
person claimed.
Judge Fletcher, concurring and dissenting, joined Judge Reinhardt in
rejecting Eain v. Wilkes; she joined Judge Duniway, however, in rejecting
the geographic limitation, emphasizing the danger of inconsistent results.
She noted, for example, that acts carried out by PIRA members in
Northern Ireland would be protected, while the same acts occurring in
London would not.28 2 The judge would leave to case-by-case decision the
extension of the protection of the political offense exception to a non-
citizen of the state in which the uprising occurs. In making this determi-
nation, she advised the court to consider the strength of the accused's ties
to the state. In Judge Fletcher's estimation, here the requisite informa-
tion linking the defendant to Northern Ireland was lacking,2 3 leading
her to recommend remand for further elaboration of the record. 28 4
None of the three opinions is wholly satisfactory. Judge Duniway ex-
pressed a preference for examining the tactics and methods employed by
terrorists, but failed to make a convincing case for his choice. Judge
Fletcher would have left judge-made law largely in its present unsatisfac-
tory state. Judge Reinhardt championed the political incidence test,
while straining to impose some limitation on the atrocities it must toler-
ate. In this effort, the majority standard fails. As Judges Duniway and
Fletcher correctly pointed out, the geographic limitation is unworkable.
Furthermore, the test of a "sufficiently large" group in revolt coupled
with a more direct nexus to political goals is too vague to produce any-
thing but inconclusive results.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 818.
282. Id. at 820.





The confusion produced by the conflicting U.S. decisions in McMul-
len, Mackin, Doherty, and Quinn led the United States and the United
Kingdom to clarify the political offense exception as it exists in the extra-
dition treaty between the two countries. 28 5 The result was a Supplemen-
tary Extradition Treaty signed in June 1985,286 which specifically
removed from the protection of the Extradition Treaty's political offense
exception the following crimes and attempts to commit them: (1) of-
fenses within the scope of the Hague Convention;287 (2) offenses within
the scope of the Montreal Convention;288 (3) offenses within the scope of
the New York Convention;289 (4) offenses within the scope of the Hos-
tages Convention;290 (5) murder and manslaughter; (6) malicious wound-
ing or inflicting grievous bodily harm; (7) kidnapping, unlawful
detention, and related offenses, including the taking of hostages; (8) of-
fenses involving explosives, if accompanied by an intent to endanger life,
or if causing serious damage to property; (9) offenses involving firearms
and ammunition, if they are possessed with an intent to endanger life, or
are used with an intent to resist or prevent arrest; and (10) damaging
property with an intent to endanger life, or with reckless disregard of the
likelihood of endangering life. By narrowing the political offense excep-
tion, this treaty enhances significantly the ability of the United States and
the United Kingdom to extradite individuals charged with terrorist activ-
ities in each other's territories.
6. The Future of the Political Offense Exception
The roots of the current political offense problem lie in continuing un-
certainty about the theoretical basis of the exception. If the role of the
exception is to insulate the executive, and thereafter the judiciary, from
hard foreign policy choices, then assignment of the question to judicial
determination and the consequent two- or three-pronged political inci-
dence test have served us well. If, on the other hand, the purpose is to
protect the human rights of unsuccessful rebels, the test may be over-
restrictive, particularly if the courts accept the qualitative and geographi-
285. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United Kingdom-United States, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
286. Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, June 25, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1104 (1985) [hereinafter Supple-
mentary Extradition Treaty]. Senate consideration of the Supplementary Treaty aroused sub-
stantial controversy. Wall St. J., May 12, 1986, at 54, col. 1. Ultimately, in July 1986, the
Senate consented to ratification. See N.Y. Times, supra note 221.
287. See supra note 54.
288. See supra note 64.
289. See supra note 75.
290. See supra note 91.
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cal limitations that Judge Reinhardt placed upon its "incidental" aspect
in Quinn v. Robinson. Finally, if the exception's rationale is the mainte-
nance of world order through a balanced tolerance of some, but not all,
violent rebellion, the goal would be more effectively realized through in-
corporation of the Swiss concept of proportionality into the doctrine.291
While the Eain v. Wilkes court noted that proportionality may al-
ready be an unspoken part of the judicial formulation, it is difficult to
find traces of its influence before Eain. Thereafter, it appeared briefly in
the dicta in Doherty, which suggested that international crimes should
not receive political offense protection. Finally, proportionality was
championed implicitly in Judge Duniway's concurrence in Quinn. Given
the entrenched strength of the political incidence test in U.S. case law,
however, it is unlikely that proportionality will ever be judicially incor-
porated into U.S. extradition law.
Proportionality could become part of U.S. extradition law through leg-
islative enactment. Such a development appears equally improbable,
however. The failure of various extradition procedure reform acts in the
early 1980's, and the stridency of the debates surrounding ratification of
the Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom in
1986, demonstrate the potential for acerbic disagreement on this issue.
Proportionality could also be introduced through executive action; af-
ter all, the Supplementary Treaty with the United Kingdom entered U.S.
law in this way. That treaty mechanically incorporates the proportional-
ity principle in its detailed provisions denying political offense protection
to specific offenses, including those made international crimes by the
multilateral anti-terrorist conventions, and to more general offenses com-
mitted by means of explosives or firearms. The Supplementary Treaty
thus embodies a judgment that certain offenses and certain means areper
se disproportionate to political goals.
The scope of depoliticization afforded by the Supplementary Treaty is
great; the treaty denies protection to almost any violent opposition to the
political status quo that endangers life or limb, and to some opposition
that merely endangers property. More importantly, it illustrates how
proportionality can be brought into U.S. law by the executive in the form
of an international agreement with a state with which the United States
has a relationship of trust and goodwill. Through agreements of this
sort, proportionality may well play an important role in U.S. extradition
law. Moreover, modification of the exception through treaties has the
advantage of removing courts from politically sensitive decision-making.
Such modifications tailor the reach of the exception to the historic char-
acter of relations with particular states. Through their specificity, bilat-
291. See supra text accompanying notes 230-33.
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eral agreements can minimize the inconsistency resulting from varying
judicial constructions of the present law. Treaty-making involves the ex-
ecutive in determining the scope of the exception without requiring dis-
ruptive changes in extradition procedure, and without subjecting
individual extradition decisions to the corrosive influence of short-term
politics.
B. Alternatives to Extradition
Extradition is unquestionably the most commonly used method by
which countries obtain personal jurisdiction over an accused interna-
tional criminal. Nonetheless, states also rely on other means, including
government transfers of fugitives without extradition formalities, "dis-
guised extradition," and abduction.292
1. Informal Surrender of Fugitives
Informal surrender may occur by mistake. In the 1970 Kudirka inci-
dent, for example, Coast Guard officers unwittingly returned to Soviet
authorities a Lithuanian seaman who had boarded a U.S. ship in U.S.
waters to request asylum.293 Extralegal transfers may also, however, be
intentional. The defendant in United States v. Sobel1294 claimed that
Mexican authorities carried him against his will to the U.S. border,
where American agents arrested him. Whether purposeful or unplanned,
the informal procedures used in these instances apparently suited the in-
terests of the states involved. Nonetheless, they violated international law
by abridging the human rights of the surrendered individuals. 295
2. Disguised Extradition
A state engages in "disguised extradition" when it employs legal pro-
cedures other than extradition to transfer a fugitive from its territory into
the hands of another state's authorities. The seizure of the West German
Embassy in Stockholm in April 1975 by members of the Baader-
Meinhoff group precipitated resort to this variant of extradition. After
murdering the economics and military attaches, the terrorists took the
rest of the embassy's occupants hostage and then blew up the building
292. This classification is derived from C. VAN DEN WUNGAERT, supra note 169, at 51. A
general discussion of alternatives to extradition appears in Evans, Extradition and Rendition:
Problems of Choice, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 226, at 1.
293. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 169, at 53.
294. 142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd., 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1957), cerL denied,
355 U.S. 873, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 920 (1958).
295. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 19 at 143-75. But see Brownlie, The Place of the Indi-
vidual in International Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 435 (1964) (concluding that the individual is far
less than a full subject of international law).
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while wiring it for demolition. Sweden could not extradite the surviving
attackers because Swedish law did not permit extradition for domestic
offenses. Nonetheless, to avoid further violence, the Swedish government
decided not to prosecute the Baader-Meinhoff members in Swedish
courts. Sweden then formally expelled the remaining terrorists for immi-
gration violations and thus facilitated their arrest by West Germany.
296
As one commentator has observed, "[i]t is improper for one state to re-
quest another to deport or to expel an individual as a means of circum-
venting extradition procedures. In reality, however, these matters are
often finessed.
'297
Disguised extradition is not unknown in U.S. practice. After the
United Kingdom's unsuccessful attempt to extradite Peter McMullen in
1979,298 the United States tried to deport McMullen to the Republic of
Ireland. McMullen resisted, arguing that after bombing the British
Army barracks in Yorkshire he had denounced and resigned from the
Provisional Irish Republican Army, and had cooperated with British and
American investigations. As a result, he feared that the PIRA would
murder him upon his return to Ireland.299 Holding that McMullen was
likely to be persecuted in his home country, the immigration judge
found, pursuant to the Refugee Act of 19 80,300 that he was not deport-
able. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed on the grounds that
McMullen had not demonstrated a sufficient threat to his life; on Mc-
Mullen's petition for review, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
Board.3
01
Subsequently, the Board reconsidered the case, and found that because
of his former gun-running and the leadership role he maintained in the
PIRA, McMullen was statutorily deportable.302 Terming his PIRA of-
fenses "acts of an atrocious nature out of proportion to the political goal
of achieving a unified Ireland," the Board held him responsible for a "se-
rious nonpolitical crime outside the United States" and refused to with-
296. C. VAN DEN WLJNGAERT, supra note 169, at 52.
297. Blakesley, supra note 156, at 713-14 (footnote omitted).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 256-57.
299. These facts are found in McMullen v. I.N.S., 658 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1981).
300. Codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
301. 658 F.2d at 1319.
302. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A) (1982) permits the deportation of any alien who "ordered,
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." The stat-
ute's language is taken from the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (incorporating by reference the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150). For a thorough discussion of the impact of the Convention upon
the domestic immigration laws of five major western nations, including the United States, see
Sexton, Political Refugees, Nonrefoulement and State Practice: A Comparative Study, 18




hold his deportation.3 03 This time the Ninth Circuit upheld both the
Board's inquiry into the political character of McMullen's offenses and
its distinction between political offense as defined for the purposes of ex-
tradition and political offense as defined for deportation purposes. The
court reasoned that "in contrast to extradition, deportation is a matter
solely between the United States government and the individual seeking
withholding of deportation .... Thus, we find ourselves unencumbered
by the concerns we expressed in Quinn that we should be careful not to
interfere with the political processes in other cultures .. . . 304 More-
over, for deportation cases the court specifically endorsed a balancing
approach, including consideration of the "offense's 'proportionality' to
its objective and its degree of atrocity. '30 5
Applying this test, the court determined that although the PIRA was
"unquestionably a 'terrorist' organization, '30 6 its political and nonpoliti-
cal terrorist acts were distinguishable. Relying upon both Eain v.
Wilkes 307 and In re Meunier,30 8 the court sharply differentiated "terror-
ist acts directed at the military or official agencies of the state, and ran-
dom acts of violence against ordinary citizens that are intended only to
promote social chaos. ' 30 9 Without explicit confirmation of McMullen's
personal participation in the latter type of activities, the court looked to
evidence of his willing and material involvement in an organization
which carried them out:
McMullen's claims that he did not actually participate in the civilian vio-
lence, even if true, do not help his cause. We are unmoved by the pleas of a
terrorist that he should not in any way be held responsible for the acts of his
fellows; acts that, by his own admission, he aided by training others and
assisting in arms shipments, and otherwise abetted and encouraged. 310
The pragmatic conception of a "political crime" which emerges from
the McMullen litigation is a welcome addition to current legal thinking.
As technology offers terrorists an ever wider selection of lethal weapons,
the political incidence test of Quinn v. Robinson fails to discriminate
among practices and practitioners of political violence. At best, Quinn
concedes U.S. neutrality towards horrific attacks against innocents, as
long as they are carried out in the right place by representatives of a
group large enough to link the crime to an accepted political goal. Mc-
303. The Board's opinion is quoted in McMullen v. I.N.S., 788 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir.
1986).
304. Id. at 596 (citation omitted).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 597.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 266-68.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 238-40.
309. 788 F.2d at 597.
310. Id. at 599.
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Mullen, however, expands the scope of deportation as part of a more
determined American response to terrorism.
3. Abduction
In international law, the abduction of fugitives in lieu of extradition is
unquestionably improper. 311 The practice violates international law by
disrupting world order, infringing upon the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of other states, and violating the human rights of the individuals
seized.312 Most commentators agree that the state responsible for such
an abduction is legally obliged to return the abducted person to the state
from whose territory he was kidnapped. In fact, however, the divergent
treatment of abduction between international and most national law has
resulted in the return of only a handful of abductees.
313
The most famous abduction case is undoubtedly Israel's kidnapping of
Adolf Eichmann from Argentina. Following Argentina's complaint re-
garding infringement of its sovereignty, the United Nations Security
Council requested that Israel "make appropriate reparation ... in ac-
cordance with . . . the rules of international law."'314 A joint Israeli-
Argentine communique, however, closed the incident by including
Israel's acknowledgment that the action taken by its citizens in kidnap-
ping Eichmann "infringed the fundamental rights of the State of Argen-
tina. '315 Meanwhile, Israel tried Eichmann and hanged him.
Despite international law's well-defined opposition to abduction as a
substitute for extradition, it remains unclear whether national courts will
exercise in personam jurisdiction over abducted terrorists. English
courts have confronted this issue for nearly two centuries and have main-
tained their jurisdiction to try British subjects wanted at home and ab-
ducted abroad. 316 In the United States, the most influential treatment of
this issue is the Supreme Court's opinion in Ker v. Illinois.317 Under
indictment in Cook County, Illinois for larceny and embezzlement, Ker
escaped to Peru. The United States issued extradition papers and dis-
patched agents to serve them; instead of filing the papers, however, the
agents forced Ker aboard a ship and held him incommunicado until his
311. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 169, at 54-55.
312. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 124.
313. Id. at 125. While internationalists tend to emphasize the protection of the rights of
the state of refuge, national courts are more concerned with adjudication of the original crimi-
nal offense once the fugitive is before them.
314. 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June 1960) at 35, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960).
315. See Evans, supra note 292, at 9 n.35.
316. See, e.g., Exparte Scott, 109 Eng. Rep. 166 (1829) (court accepts jurisdiction to try
Englishwoman conveyed involuntarily to England by British forces); Ex parte Elliott, [1949]
All E.R. 373 (urisdiction exercised over British Army deserter arrested, despite contrary Bel-
gian law, by British forces in Belgium).




arrival in San Francisco. The Supreme Court held that the failure of
American authorities to abide by the United States-Peru extradition
treaty did not affect Cook County's ultimate jurisdiction over Ker.318
Subsequent cases have expressed the rule in terms of the maxim mala
captus bene detentus, under which a court may assert in personam juris-
diction without inquiring into the means by which the attendance of the
accused was secured.319
U.S. courts have produced a rich jurisprudence on the mala captus
bene detentus doctrine in recent years. In 1973, the Ninth Circuit ap-
proved district court jurisdiction over two U.S. citizens who had been
brought forcibly from South Vietnam on charges of theft of U.S. govern-
ment property in Japan.320 The Fifth Circuit adopted the rule in 1979321
and extended its reach to nonresident aliens in United States v. Winter.322
The Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the Ker rule
without qualification as well. 323
Only one circuit has limited the Ker rule. In a Second Circuit case,
United States v. Toscanino,324 an Italian national appealed his conviction
for conspiracy to import narcotics into the United States. He alleged
that he had been abducted from Uruguay by Uruguayan police acting for
the United States and taken to Brazil, where he was tortured in the pres-
ence of a U.S. official. Thereafter, Toscanino claimed, he was drugged
and transported to the United States in the custody of U.S. officials. The
318. It is an especially interesting feature of the Ker case that it was announced the same
day as, and reported immediately after, United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), and
that Justice Miller wrote both opinions. Rauscher held that an accused who was properly
surrendered under an extradition treaty could be tried only for the offense for which he was
formally extradited (the principle of speciality). It might seem to follow that no fugitive could
be tried for any offense if he could have been the subject of a proper extradition, but was not
extradited. This logic is urged in Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Viola-
tion of International Law, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1934). Ker, however, was distinguished
from Rauscher by noting that the extradition treaty in the former case "was not called into
operation, was not relied upon." 119 U.S. at 443. The Ker rule was soon applied in In re
Ezeta, 62 F. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (American court jurisdiction over Salvadoran Army com-
manders brought unwillingly to the United States). See supra text accompanying notes 253-
55.
319. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 122. The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed this princi-
ple in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), an interstate rendition case. This case gave rise
to the common denomination of mala captus bene detentus as the "Ker-Frisbie doctrine."
Because this article is only concerned with the doctrine's international application, it will be
referred to as the Ker doctrine.
320. United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973).
321. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979) (arrest by the Coast Guard
beyond the geographic limits of its authority did not vitiate the district court's jurisdiction over
those improperly arrested).
322. 509 F.2d at 975 (Bahamian nationals unsuccessfully contested American jurisdiction
after their illegal arrest by the Coast Guard in the territorial waters of another sovereign state).
323. Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1964); United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d
257 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984).
324. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Second Circuit held that, if true, such "deliberate, unnecessary, and un-
reasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights" by the United
States would deprive its courts of jurisdiction.
325
The Second Circuit sharply limited the scope of Toscanino in several
later cases, however. In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler 326 the
court held that conduct must be "of the most outrageous and reprehensi-
ble kind" to trigger application of Toscanino, and that, moreover, the
right to complain of any formal violation of international law belonged to
the state whose sovereignty had been compromised, and not to the ac-
cused.3 27 A later case328 established that the egregious conduct necessary
to bring Toscanino into play had to occur at the hands of the U.S. gov-
ernment. More recently, in United States v. Reed, 329 the court defined
the limits of the Toscanino rule, holding that the CIA did not "gross[ly]
mistreat" the defendant by illegally enticing him onto a private plane on
Bimini and then compelling him to lie on the floor of the plane with a
cocked revolver to his head during the flight to Florida, "threatening to
blow his brains out."' 330 Subsequent cases in other circuits have either
expressly rejected Toscanino or limited it to its facts.
331
Judicial willingness to exercise personal jurisdiction over abducted ter-
rorists suggests that forcible abduction of terrorist fugitives from their
countries of refuge may become an increasingly important tool of Ameri-
can policy. Such actions, while certainly controversial, would undoubt-
edly find greater international and domestic support than repeated resort
to military counterstrikes in which the real culprits will often remain
unharmed while innocent civilians are killed. Moreover, although ab-
duction may at first appear arbitrary and brutal, it may gain legitimacy
ex post if it leads to regular trials.
Nonetheless, the Ker rule operates within narrow parameters. Every
modem abduction case in U.S. courts has rested upon the acquiescence,
if not the outright complicity, of the state from which the fugitive was
325. Id. at 275. On remand, however, Toscanino failed to meet the burden of proving his
allegations. 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
326. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
327. Id. at 67-68. "Lacking from Lujan's petition is any allegation of that complex of
shocking governmental conduct sufficient to convert an abduction which is simply illegal into
one which sinks to a violation of due process." Id. at 66.
328. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975) (American defendant claimed to
have been tortured by Chilean police before being forced to return to the United States).
329. 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981).
330. Id. at 902.
331. United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976) (Toscanino requires conduct
which shocks court's conscience); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984)
(American officials who allegedly abducted British subject in Honduras and forced him to fly
to Miami did not act sufficiently egregiously to trigger Toscanino. Court holds Toscanino ques-
tionable in light of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975), in which the Supreme Court
held that an "illegal arrest does not void a subsequent conviction.").
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abducted. No modem American court has confronted a case similar to
the Eichmann affair, where the state from which the suspect was ab-
ducted protested to the United Nations. Moreover, to date no abduction
case has involved either a non-extraditable fugitive seized under both
American and foreign political offense laws or a fugitive who has re-
ceived formal or de facto asylum in a foreign country. Under such cir-
cumstances, a U.S. court might be more reluctant to exercise jurisdiction
over an abductee.
332
A judicial assertion of personal jurisdiction in abduction cases is more
likely if the fugitive's guilt is clear, his offenses atrocious, and the hands
of the protesting state unclean. Further, a U.S. court will have greater
authority to assume personal jurisdiction if the offender's conduct itself
violated international law, especially if such conduct was proscribed by a
multilateral anti-terrorist convention. The exercise of jurisdiction over
such an abducted offender by U.S. courts would encourage states not to
apply the political offense exception to international crimes. Further-
more, the assertion of jurisdiction would suggest United Nations ap-
proval of the action, and thereby dissuade a compromised state from
protesting the American abduction.
Generally, international legal scholars have opposed all irregular
means of rendition, including abduction.333 Yet, in a world where "most
states-members of the U.N. approve, directly or indirectly, of the motives
and consequences of terror-violence," 334 extradition requests will fre-
quently be denied and resort to self-help in bringing terrorists to justice
may be inevitable. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz has defended
the practice for precisely such reasons:
It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing ter-
rorists in international waters or airspace, [or] from attacking them on the
soil of other nations .... International law requires no such result. A
332. After all, the right to complain of international law violations resulting from abduc-
tions inheres not in the individual thus brought before the court, but in the state whose territo-
rial integrity was violated. Given this fact, there would appear to be no reason not to apply the
Ker rule to cases of informal surrender and disguised extradition. Since the state from which
the fugitive was rendered participates in rendition, it will most likely not complain that extra-
dition procedures were circumvented.
333. See, e.g., M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 19, at 124, arguing that "[a]t this stage of devel-
opment of international law it is no longer possible to rationalize violations of international
law on grounds of raison d'etat or to allow such violations to be perpetrated without an ade-
quate deterrent-remedy."
334. Friedlander, Mere Rhetoric Is Not Enough, 7 HARV. INT'L REV. 4, 6 (1985). But see
General Assembly Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1955,
G.A. Res. 40/61, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 301, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1986), and
Security Council Resolution Condemning Hostage Taking, Dec. 18, 1985, S.C. Res. 579, 40
SCOR Reso. & Dec. at 24, U.N. Doc. S/INF/41 (1985), both produced by the United Nations
subsequent to Professor Friedlander's observation.
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nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force ... to seize terrorists
or to rescue its citizens when no other means is available.3 35
The Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Marshals Service are
reportedly preparing a contingency plan for seizing specific fugitive ter-
rorists from other states. 336 While conceding that such behavior would
violate international law, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State
has defended extralegal methods of capture in extreme cases.337 The
United States resorted to abduction in October 1985, when it intercepted
the Egyptian aircraft containing the Achille Lauro hijackers and forced it
to land at a NATO airfield in Italy. This action enabled the Italian gov-
ernment to prosecute the terrorists.
Conclusion
Terrorism is one of the gravest threats facing the international commu-
nity today. In recent years, the number of worldwide terrorist acts has
skyrocketed, with terrorists employing more and more sophisticated
means of carrying out their deadly mission. Searching for a way to cur-
tail these acts is a confusing and frustrating enterprise. While it may
never be possible to put an end to international terrorism, it is crucial
that the world employ whatever means it can to put terrorists on notice
that it does not take terrorist activity lightly and that the perpetrators of
political violence will be held personally accountable for their actions.
As one of the world's leaders in the fight against terrorism, the United
States has a special responsibility to send a strong signal both to other
nations and to terrorists themselves that it will not tolerate international
terrorism. To this end, the United States must ensure that its criminal
jursidiction comprehends every conceivable type of terrorist activity
against U.S. citizens. While the multilateral counterterrorism effort has
apparently come to a standstill, it is crucial that the United States assume
a leading role in promoting mutual international resolve by continuing to
push forcefully for multilateral action, as well as by pursuing bilateral
understandings with other nations. Simultaneously, the United States
must unilaterally amend its own laws to comprehend extraterritorial ter-
rorist action; such legislation would serve as a model for the legislative
efforts of many other nations which are equally disturbed by the recent
upswing in international lawlessness. Additionally, legislative standards
are required to add predictability to the present confusion over the ex-
traditability of foreign terrorists from the United States.
335. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1986, at Al, col. 5.





In its fight against terrorism, the United States must not be afraid to
employ creative means to bring terrorists to U.S. courts for prosecution.
If, at times, this goal requires the United States to resort to such ex-
traordinary measures as abduction, the United States must not hesitate
to take such measures. That increased U.S. vigilance will not, by itself,
necessarily lead to a decrease in the volume of terrorist activity does not
diminish the importance of U.S. action. Strong U.S. efforts will spur
other nations to direct.their creative energy toward putting an end to
international violence. And, if nothing else, equity requires that violence
with an international flavor be treated no more leniently than other hei-
nous crimes.
